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I The Peru-Agricultural Products case and the difficulties in rebutting the 
presumption of good faith in international disputes  
 
1. The principle of good faith in international law 
 
The obligation to act in good faith is an essential underpinning of any legal system. The 
International Court of Justice in the Nuclear Tests case stated in this regard that “one of 
the basic principles governing the creation and performance of legal obligations, 
whatever their source, is the principle of good faith.”3 Mitchell and O’Connor consider 
the touchstone of good faith to be honesty, a subjective state of mind, but argue the 
principle can also “incorporate notions of fairness and reasonableness, both of which 
concern an objective state of affairs.”4 
 
From the perspective of the sources of public international law
5
, the principle of good 
faith is widely recognized as one of the most important general principles of law,
6
 and it 
applies to all international obligations
7
. However, good faith may also be subject to 
more concrete expressions under other sources of international law, such as customary 
law and treaty law.
8
   
 
In international treaty law, the general functions of the principle of good faith have been 
codified under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) and are also 
deemed to be an expression of customary international law. In this respect, good faith 
refers to the context of the performance (Article 26) and the interpretation of a treaty 
(Article 31 (1)), and also underlies the obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of 
a treaty prior to its entry into force (Article 18).  
 
1.1.Good faith under Article 18 of the VCLT 
 
The meaning and scope of, as well as the duties arising from Article 18 of the VCLT
9
, 
have been little explored and analyzed in international jurisprudence.
10
 The good faith 
                                                 
3
 Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v France), ICJ Reports, 1974, Judgment (20 December 1974), para. 46.  
4
 See Andrew Mitchell. ‘Good Faith in WTO Dispute Settlement’ (2006) 7 [2] Melbourne Journal of 
International Law 340; and John O’Connor, Good Faith in International Law (Dartmouth Publishing 
1991) 118-19. Following the Macquarie Dictionary (2
nd
 ed, 1991, 754), Mitchell considers the ordinary 
meaning of good faith as “honesty of purpose or sincerity of declaration” or the “expectation of such 
qualities in others”, ibid.  
5
 The identification of the “sources of public international law” is commonly understood by reference to 
Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which includes “general principles 
of law recognized by civilized nations”. Nevertheless, as noted by Rosalyn Higgins, some writers find it 
too narrow that international law is defined as that which the ICJ would apply in a given case. See 
Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and how we use it (OUP 1994) 17-18. 
6
 As observed by Marion Panizzon, of the general principles of law, good faith has been that most often 
invoked by international tribunals. Marion Panizzon, ‘Fairness, Promptness and Effectiveness: How the 
Openness of Good Faith Limits the Flexibility of the DSU’ (2008) NCCR Trade Regulation – Swiss 
National Centre of Competence in Research, Working Paper No 2007/19, 1. 
7
 Anthony Aust, Handbook of International Law (2nd
 
edn, CUP 2010) 8.  
8
 For example, according to the “Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (GA Res. 
2625 (XXV), adopted 24 October 1970) states shall “fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them 
in accordance with the Charter” of the United Nations. Vaughan Lowe rightly observes the broad scope of 
this reference, since it does not only relate to the obligations under the Charter, but in accordance with 
the Charter. See Vaughan Lowe, International Law (OUP 2007) 117. 
9
 Article 18 of the VCLT reads as follow:  
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obligation derived from this provision of the VCLT deserves particular attention since, 
as will be further developed, it was one of the main arguments brought by Peru before 
the WTO in the case Peru – Additional Duty on Imports of Certain Agricultural 
Products (hereinafter Peru – Agricultural Products). In effect, the panel and the 
Appellate Body were asked to analyze the legal implications of Article 18 of the VCLT 
in the context of the rights and obligations of the WTO Members under Articles 3.7 and 
3.10 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). 
 
What constitutes the most salient characteristic of Article 18 of the VCLT is that it 
concerns the existence of certain duties that govern treaties before the time of their entry 
into force. This gives proof that good faith “shall not only apply during the performance 
and enforcement of a treaty but also at an earlier stage of its formation, the pre-
ratification period.”11 Notwithstanding this, the obligation to act in good faith 
underpinning Article 18 of the VCLT has certainly a more limited scope than the 
overall set of obligations and rights arising from the entry into force of a treaty. The first 
paragraph of Article 18 of the VCLT indeed refers to the obligation “to refrain from 
acts”, and is circumscribed to the obligation not to defeat the “object and purpose” of a 
treaty. In this regard, its scope is more restricted as compared with the obligations 
derived from the principle of pacta sunt servanda, which only apply upon the entry into 
force of a treaty. 
 
1.2.Historical Background of Article 18 of the VCLT 
 
With Mark Villiger, we may find the origins of Article 18 of the VCLT in Article 9 of 
the Harvard Draft on the Law of Treaties of 1935
12
, which states: 
 
 “under some circumstances…good faith may require that pending the coming 
into force of the treaty the States shall, for a reasonable time after signature, 
refrain from taking action which would render performance by any party of the 
obligations stipulated impossible or more difficult.” 
 
Interestingly, the duty embodied in Article 9 of the Harvard Draft was not deemed in 
the sense of a legal obligation, and it may be noted that the reference to “actions which 
would render performance” of the obligations stipulated “impossible or more difficult” 
is limited to “exceptional cases and special circumstances”.13 Many years later the 
International Law Commission included a similar provision in Article 15 of the Draft 
                                                                                                                                               
“Obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its entry into force 
A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when: 
(a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the treaty subject to ratification, 
acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty; or 
(b) it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry into force of the treaty and 
provided that such entry into force is not unduly delayed.” 
10
 The International Court of Justice was confronted with the issue of the effect of a treaty signed but not 
in force in North Sea Continental Shelf Case (Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands) (Federal 
Republic of Germany/Denmark), ICJ Reports 1969, Judgment 20 February 1969, and Reservations to the 
Convention on Genocide, ICJ Reports 1951, Advisory Opinion 28 May 1951. 
11
 Markus Kotzur, ‘Good Faith (Bona fide)’, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law 
(2009) para. 21, available at: http://campus.unibo.it/180450/7/EPIL_Good_Faith_Bona_fide.pdf 
(23.2.2016).  
12
 Mark Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 2009) 246. 
13
 ibid.  
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Articles on the Law of Treaties adopted in 1966.
14
 However, Article 15 of the Draft 
Articles is different from Article 9 of the Harvard Draft in two respects. On the one 
hand, it refers to the obligation to refrain from acts “tending to frustrate the object of a 
proposed treaty” prior to its entry into force. As such, it requires that the acts frustrating 
the object of a treaty are committed intentionally in bad faith. On the other hand, it not 
only refers to the duties of states attributed to them as signatories to a treaty, but also 
includes the case of states that, while not signatories to a treaty, have agreed to enter 
into negotiations for the conclusion thereof.   
 
Against this background, it is noteworthy that Article 18 of the VCLT was drafted to 
some extent with a broader scope than its predecessor versions under the Harvard Draft 
of 1935 and the ILC Draft Articles of 1966. In effect, contrary to Article 9 of the 
Harvard Draft of 1935, Article 18 of the VCLT does not require that the state’s actions 
render the performance of a treaty “impossible”. Similarly, in contrast to Article 15 of 
the ILC Draft Articles, Article 18 of the VCLT does not require that the acts defeating 
the object and purpose of a treaty are committed intentionally in bad faith.
15
 Conversely, 
however, Article 18 has a narrower scope in that it does not include the case of states 
that have agreed to enter into negotiations for the conclusion of a treaty, but only relates 
to states that either: (i) have “signed the treaty” or have “exchanged instruments 
constituting the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval”; or (ii) have 
expressed consent to be bound by the treaty, “pending the entry into force of the treaty 
and provided that such entry into force is not unduly delayed.” 
 
Therefore, it is possible to assert that the obligation not to defeat the object and purpose 
of a treaty prior to its entry into force has evolved over time. Regarding its final version 
under the VCLT, Boisson de Chazournes, La Rosa and Mbengue point out that although 
Article 18 of the VCLT does not make explicit reference to the principle of good faith, 
the travaux préparatoires thereof reveal that it has to be considered as one of its 
applications.
16
 Yet, these authors also highlight that, before the Vienna Convention, a 
general obligation in international law concerning the phase prior to the entry into force 
of a treaty had existed neither de facto nor de jure.
17
 In this regard, Article 18 of the 
VCLT becomes one important means of implementing the principle of good faith in 
treaty-based relations, since it postulates a genuine legal obligation as opposed to a 
mere moral duty.
18
 Currently, Article 18 appears declaratory of customary international 
law, and hence the obligation set forth therein derives for all states from general 
international law.
19
 
 
 
                                                 
14
 The text was adopted by the International Law Commission at its eighteenth session, in 1966, and 
submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations as part of the Commission’s report covering the 
work of that session.  
15
 Villiger (n 12) 250. 
16
 Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Anne-Marie La Rosa and Makane Moise Mbengue, ‘1969 Vienna 
Convention. Article 18: Obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its entry into 
force’ in Oliver Corten and Pierre Klein (eds), The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties: A 
Commentary (Volume I, OUP 2011) 372. 
17
 ibid 374. Taking a different view, however, Mark Villiger points out that in 1966 the ILC generally 
considered that the provision leading to today’s Article 18 has a basis in customary law. Villiger (n 12) 
252. 
18
 Boisson de Chazournes (n 16) 397. 
19
 Villiger (n 12) 247. 
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1.3.Meaning and Scope of Article 18 of the VCLT 
 
The scope of Article 18 of the VCLT is defined by considerations rationae materiae 
and ratione temporis relating to the obligation set forth therein. The obligation to 
“refrain from acts” applies ratione materiae to the “object and purpose” of a treaty, and 
finds a limitation ratione temporis in the sense that it lasts either from the time of 
signature or exchange of instruments constituting the treaty until that of ratification, 
acceptance or approval (Article 18 (a)); or from the time where a state has expressed its 
consent to be bound by a treaty until the entry into force thereof (Article 18 (b)).
20
  
 
The fact that the legal obligation envisaged in Article 18 of the VCLT is put in terms of 
“refrain from acts”, and that there is no further reference as to what type of acts may 
“defeat the object and purpose” of a treaty, leads to difficulties in the interpretation of 
this provision. This circumstance is indeed a general trait of the principle of good faith, 
whose scope is limited by the fact that it carries little normative effect, notwithstanding 
that the normative vagueness and versatility of its meaning lead to the recurring 
regularity of its presence in treaties and case law.
21
  
 
As to the meaning of the obligation prescribed in Article 18 of the VCLT, it is clear that 
the expression “refrain from acts” refers mainly to the passive conduct of states. 
However, while the ILC pointed out in 2007 that Article 18 (a) does not oblige a 
signatory state to respect the treaty, “but merely to refrain from rendering the treaty 
inoperative prior to its expression of consent to be bound”, comments in the ILC and 
subsequent state practice “confirm that the object and purpose of Article 18 could 
indeed exceptionally call for active conduct, e.g., to maintain the pre-contractual status 
quo on which basis a treaty was concluded.”22   
 
International jurisprudence, both of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and its 
predecessor the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), has also shed light on 
the obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its entry into 
force. The ICJ, in its advisory opinion concerning Reservations to the Convention on 
Genocide, stated that although the signature of a treaty which requires ratification for its 
entry into force does not make the signatory state a party to the treaty, it establishes a 
“provisional status” in favor of that state.23 The PCIJ in turn, in the well-known case 
Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, had to decide on a claim against 
Germany’s alienation of property on territory which was to fall under Polish 
sovereignty upon the entry into force of the Versailles Treaty of 1919. Importantly, 
while the Court confirmed that Germany retained the right to dispose of her property 
until the transfer of sovereignty, it also held that a “misuse of this right could endow an 
act of alienation with the character of a breach of the Treaty”.24 
 
From a general perspective, however, it is observed that the obligation underlying 
Article 18 of the VCLT is most commonly understood in terms of making every good 
                                                 
20
 Boisson de Chazournes (n 16) 383. 
21
 Panizzon (n 6) 10. 
22
 Villiger (n 12) 249.  
23
 Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, ICJ Reports 1951, Advisory Opinion, 17-18. 
24
 Case concerning certain German interests in Polish Upper Silesia. Permanent Court of International 
Justice (1926), Series A, Judgment no. 7, 30. 
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faith effort “to obtain the consent of the sovereign”25 and of not being obstructive as to 
its own given consent once the executive branch has signed the treaty through its 
agents.
26
 
 
Finally, it is noteworthy that the scope of Article 18 of the VCLT might be limited in 
international dispute settlement by the fact that it is assumed that states act in good faith 
and, therefore, it is upon the complainant state to prove that the specific conduct of 
another state is contrary to the principle of good faith.  In Certain German Interests in 
Polish Upper Silesia, for example, the PCIJ held that a “misuse of rights” cannot be 
presumed and that “it rests with the party who states that there has been such misuse to 
prove this statement”.27 With Lauterpacht, we can also note that the same terms were 
used in the PCIJ’s Order of 6 December 1930 in the case between Switzerland and 
France concerning the free zones of Upper Savoy and the district of Gex.
28
  
 
1.4.Good faith corollaries under Article 18 of the VCLT  
 
The principle of good faith, as rightly noted by Panizzon, expresses ‘complex’ and 
‘polar’ values in that it is associated with concepts of equity,29 such as acquiescence and 
estoppel, and has close ties to the customary rule of pacta sunt servanda, the general 
principle of legitimate expectations and the prohibition of abus de droit. 
30
 
 
Interestingly, this circumstance is manifest in the case of Article 18 of the VCLT where 
there is no explicit reference to the principle of good faith, but it is clear that the 
mention “not to defeat the object and purpose” of a treaty not yet in force reflects 
certain duties surrounding some of the corollaries of the principle of good faith. On the 
one hand, Article 18 gives concrete and normative meaning to the principle of good 
faith by protecting the legitimate expectations of the states involved in a treaty already 
signed but not yet in force.
31
 The objective of legal legitimacy and transparency 
demands in this regard that states refrain from acts contrary to a treaty even before it has 
begun to apply, so as to guarantee that states comply with a “minimum standard of 
conduct” in relation to the treaty.32 On the other hand, the theory of abuse of rights is 
relevant as an application of the principle of good faith to the exercise of rights.
33
  
 
Even though Article 18 does not address the protection of rights between state “parties” 
to a treaty, and as such it is not properly a rule governed under the principle pacta sunt 
servanda, it is no less true that this principle still postulates a minimum standard of 
conduct in the sense of a legal obligation related to not defeating the object and purpose 
of a treaty that has been signed or ratified but is not yet in force. To that extent, a fair 
                                                 
25
 Marion Panizzon, Good Faith in the Jurisprudence of the WTO. The Protection of Legitimate 
Expectations, Good Faith Interpretation and Fair Dispute Settlement (Studies in International Trade Law 
4 Hart Publishing 2006) 20. 
26
 Kotzur (n 11) para. 21. 
27
 Case concerning certain German interests in Polish Upper Silesia. Permanent Court of International 
Justice (1926), Series A, Judgment no. 7, 30. 
28
 H. Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community (OUP 2011) 296-97. 
29
 Anthony Aust has also pointed out that the obligation to act in good faith is a fundamental principle of 
international law, and that it includes equity. See Aust (n 7) 8. 
30
 Panizzon (n 25) 21. 
31
 Villiger (n 12) 247. 
32
 Boisson de Chazournes (n 16) 370. 
33
 Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as applied by International Courts and Tribunals (CUP 1993) 
121. 
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balance is kept between the respective interests of the signatory states, and upsetting 
this balance would constitute a breach of good faith in the sense of an abuse of rights.
34
 
 
In the context of the WTO, we concur with Thomas Cottier and Krista Nadakavukaren 
Schefer in pointing out that the principle of good faith and its doctrinal branches of the 
doctrine of abuse of rights and the protection of legitimate expectations are key aspects 
for the legitimacy and fairness of the WTO system, as well as for its further 
development and acceptance.
35
  
 
2. Delimiting the scope and implications of the principle of good faith in WTO 
law: the Peru – Agricultural Products case 
 
In Peru – Agricultural Products, some of the main questions both before the panel and 
on appeal were related to the scope of Guatemala’s good faith obligations under Articles 
3.7 and 3.10 of the DSU. The measure at issue in the dispute was the “additional duty 
imposed by Peru on imports of certain agricultural products, such as milk, maize, rice 
and sugar” which was determined by using a mechanism known as the “Price Range 
System” (PRS).36 Against this background, Peru argued as the respondent Member that 
Guatemala did not initiate the proceedings in good faith, mainly because Guatemala 
accepted the maintenance of the PRS in the Free Trade Agreement between Guatemala 
and Peru, signed in 2011 but not in force,
37
 and “subsequently sought its 
dismantlement” in the context of the proceedings.38 In connection with this, Peru held 
that, in bringing a claim before the WTO in order to question the PRS, Guatemala was 
infringing the obligation stemming from Article 18 of the VCLT not to defeat the object 
and purpose of a treaty “through actions that would render the provisions of the treaty 
meaningless.”39  
 
The interpretation of the panel and the Appellate Body in this case concerning the 
meaning and scope of the good faith obligations pursuant to Articles 3.7 and 3.10 of the 
DSU confirms the boundaries of construing a legal defense based on the principle of 
good faith in the context of the WTO dispute settlement system. As will be explained 
below, these boundaries are mainly related to: (i) the difficulties in rebutting the 
presumption of good faith, (ii) the necessary consistency of good faith obligations with 
WTO law, and (iii) the necessary connection of any corollary of the general principle of 
good faith with the particular expressions of good faith under the DSU.  
 
2.1.The principle of good faith under Articles 3.7 and 3.10 of the DSU 
 
Articles 3.7 and 3.10 of the DSU are two examples of how the principle of good faith 
may underpin basic rules of the WTO dispute settlement system. The good faith 
                                                 
34
 As stated by Cheng, when either an unlawful intention or design can be established or the act is clearly 
unreasonable, there is an abuse prohibited by law, ibid 129, 134. 
35
 Thomas Cottier and Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer, ‘Good Faith and the Protection of Legitimate 
Expectations in the WTO’, in Thomas Cottier (ed), The Challenge of WTO Law: Collected Essays 
(Cameron May 2007) 133-34. 
36
 Peru – Additional Duty on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products, Report of the Panel (27 
November 2014), WT/DS457/R, para. 2.2. 
37
 Free Trade Agreement between the Republic of Peru and the Republic of Guatemala, signed on 6 
December 2011.  
38
 Peru – Agricultural Products, Report of the Panel, para. 7.66. 
39
 ibid, para. 7.48.  
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obligations of WTO Members might be read explicitly in the text of DSU provisions, 
such as in Article 3.10, or be understood implicitly, such as in Article 3.7. 
 
Article 3.7 states that, before bringing a case, “a Member shall exercise its judgement” 
as to whether such action “would be fruitful”. The relevant part of Article 3.10, in turn, 
relates to the understanding that, if a dispute arises, all Members shall “engage” in WTO 
dispute settlement proceedings “in good faith in an effort to resolve the dispute”. 
 
From an overall perspective, it is worth mentioning the interpretation of Article 3.7 by 
the Appellate Body in Mexico – Corn Syrup, in terms that this provision “reflects a 
basic principle that Members should have recourse to WTO dispute settlement in good 
faith, and not frivolously set in motion the procedures contemplated in the DSU”.40 
Accordingly, the good faith obligation implied in the test of fruitfulness calls upon 
WTO Members to exercise political judgment and restraint in bringing cases.
41
 
 
With regard to Article 3.10, it is understood that the obligation to engage in good faith 
is not only limited to the decision to initiate the proceedings pursuant to the DSU. In 
this respect, the Appellate Body held in EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar that the 
obligation set forth in Article 3.10 covers “the entire spectrum of dispute settlement, 
from the point of initiation of a case through implementation.”42 Indeed, the first time 
that the Appellate Body referred to this provision in a case was as a means to define and 
construe the good faith duty of cooperation of the parties with the panel during the 
dispute settlement proceedings.
43
 With Panizzon, we can note that good faith in Article 
3.10 has made a transition from a function of encouraging amicable and alternative 
means of dispute settlement, to introducing a duty of Members to cooperate with the 
panel, and, more recently, to developing a fairness-inducing standard of good faith 
compliance.
44
 
 
2.2.Understanding Articles 3.7 and 3.10 of the DSU in a broad sense: the 
Peruvian position within the WTO 
 
As highlighted by the Appellate Body in Peru – Agricultural Products, Peru’s 
arguments both before the panel and on appeal relate to “whether Guatemala acted 
inconsistently with its good faith obligations under Articles 3.7 and 3.10 of the DSU” 
when it initiated the proceedings “after having allegedly waived in the FTA, either 
explicitly or by necessary implication, its rights to have recourse to WTO dispute 
                                                 
40
 Mexico – Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States, 
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States, Report of the Appellate Body (22 October 
2001), WT/DS132/AB/RW, AB-2001-5, para.73.  
41
 Panizzon (n 6) 15. 
42
 European Communities – Export Subsidies on Sugar, Report of the Appellate Body (19 May 2005) 
WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R, para. 312. 
43
 See Panizzon (n 6) 18, citing Canada–Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, Panel Report 
(20 August 1999) WT/DS70/R, as upheld by the Appellate Body Report, WT/DS70/AB/R. 
44
 Panizzon identifies the following WTO cases concerning the interpretation of the good faith rule under 
Article 3.10 of the DSU, each marking a stepping stone in the process towards procedural fairness in the 
DSU: (i) the Canada-Aircraft case, where the duty to cooperate is derived from good faith; (ii) the US-
FSC case, where the duty of good faith compliance is intensified by establishing the due process standard 
of fair, prompt and effective dispute resolution; (iii) the Mexico-Corn Syrup case, where the fairness 
function of due process is consolidated; and (iv) the EC-Sardines case, where there is a more clear 
distinction between good faith as a tool to tighten the flexibility of the DSU in abstracto and due process 
as a stronghold against abuses of procedural rights in concreto, ibid 16-17. 
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settlement”.45 However, it is observed that Peru also expressed in the proceedings that it 
did not agree that a waiver is “the only case in which there could be an infringement of 
the obligation to act in good faith”, since “there could be various ways of engaging in a 
procedure in bad faith”, such as when a Member “engages in a procedure with the 
intention of causing injury to another Member or impairing its rights.”46  
 
The provision to which Peru refers in order to argue that Guatemala waived its rights to 
have recourse to the WTO dispute settlement system is paragraph 9 of Annex 2.3 to the 
FTA, which reads as follows: 
 
“Peru may maintain its Price Range System, established in Supreme Decree No. 
1152001EF and the amendments thereto, with regard to the products subject to 
the application of the system marked with an asterisk (*) in column 4 of Peru’s 
Schedule as set out in this Annex.” 
 
Based on this provision of the FTA, Peru asserted as a main argument that Guatemala 
“waived its right explicitly” in the FTA, when it agreed that Peru may maintain the 
PRS.
47
 However, Peru also held, as an alternative argument, that Guatemala “waived its 
rights by necessary implication”, since the consistency of the PRS with WTO law was 
under discussion and, by virtue of Article 1.3.2 of the FTA, this treaty would prevail 
over WTO agreements in the event of any inconsistency.
48
 This Peruvian argument will 
be further developed below. 
 
Furthermore, Peru contended that the provisions over “consent” (Article 20)49 and “loss 
of the right to invoke responsibility” (Article 45)50 of the International Law 
Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
provide “additional support”51 for the interpretation that Guatemala and Peru intended 
in the FTA “to relinquish their rights”.52 
 
It is noteworthy, however, that Peru clarified on appeal that it never questioned 
“Guatemala’s right to bring a case to the WTO”. Peru argued that its position was rather 
that Articles 3.7 and 3.10 of the DSU “impose certain requirements that need to be met 
                                                 
45
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submission, para. 69. 
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before Guatemala’s case can be considered on the merits.”53 This remark is in line with 
the broad interpretation of Peru that good faith under Articles 3.7 and 3.10 of the DSU 
is not limited to ascertaining whether a Member has relinquished its right to bring a case 
before the WTO, but rather may comprise other situations where a Member does not 
engage in good faith in WTO proceedings.
54
  
 
2.3.The presumption of good faith in WTO dispute settlement proceedings 
 
With Marceau, we can note that even though in several cases the responding Member 
has claimed that the complainant has not exercised its right to initiate WTO dispute 
settlement proceedings in good faith, such claims have never been successful.
55
 One of 
the main reasons for the difficulty in successfully bringing a claim based on the 
infringement of the principle of good faith is that it is well settled case-law that good 
faith is to be presumed in international dispute settlement.  
 
In the context of the WTO dispute settlement system, it is worth mentioning the Mexico 
–Corn Syrup case, where it was stated that panels and the Appellate Body “must 
presume, whenever a Member submits a request for establishment of a panel, that such 
Member does so in good faith, having duly exercised its judgement as to whether 
recourse…would be ‘fruitful’”.56 The Appellate Body further held that the panel was 
not bound to assess the issue on its own initiative since Article 3.7 “neither requires nor 
authorizes a panel to look behind that Member’s decision and to question its exercise of 
judgement.”57 Similarly, in the Korea – Certain Paper case, the Panel found that it had 
“to assume that WTO Members engage in dispute settlement in good faith, as required 
under Article 3.10 of the DSU.”58  
 
In light of the foregoing, we concur with Marceau in noting that it is “nearly impossible 
to rebut the assumption that WTO Members engage in dispute settlements in good 
faith”, since “the threshold for proving that the challenging Member has not acted in 
good faith is extremely high”.59 As will be discussed below, the good faith friendly 
approach that the panel and Appellate Body have taken in the abovementioned cases has 
been underscored by the recent Peru-Agricultural Products case. 
 
 
                                                 
53
 ibid, para. 5.7. According to Guatemala, Peru “procedurally barred from engaging in a substantive 
consideration of the claims made by Guatemala”. See ibid, para. 5.6. 
54
 Peru – Agricultural Products, Report of the Panel, para. 7.83.  
55
 Aside from the Peru – Agricultural Products case, Marceau refers to Korea – Anti-Dumping Duties on 
Imports of Certain Paper from Indonesia (Korea – Certain Paper), Panel Report (28 November 2005) 
WT/DS312/R; and China – Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts (China – Auto Parts), Panel 
Reports (12 January 2009) WT/DS339/R, Add.1 and Add.2, WT/DS340/R, Add.1 and Add.2, and 
WT/DS342/R, Add.1 and Add.2, upheld (WT/DS339/R) and as modified (WT/DS340/R WT/Ds342/R) 
by the Reports of the Appellate Body (12 January 2009) WT/DS339/AB/R WT/DS340/AB/R 
WT/DS342/AB/R. See Gabrielle Marceau, ‘The primacy of the WTO dispute settlement system’ (2015)  
Questions of International Law (QIL), Zoom-in 23, note 20. 
56
 Mexico – Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States, 
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States, Report of the Appellate Body (22 October 
2001), WT/DS132/AB/RW, AB-2001-5, para.73. 
57
 ibid. 
58
 Korea – Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Certain Paper from Indonesia, Recourse to Article 21.5 of 
the DSU by Indonesia, Report of the Panel (28 September 2007) WT/DS312/RW, para. 6.97. 
59
 Marceau (n 55) 12. 
12 
 
2.3.1. The “largely self-regulating” character of Article 3.7 of the DSU 
 
With regard to Article 3.7 of the DSU, Guatemala held that “the obligation to exercise 
judgement as to whether bringing a case would be fruitful entails a decision by each 
Member, which a panel must presume to be made in good faith”, and that the DSU 
“does not limit a Member’s discretion with respect to the outcome” of exercising such 
judgment.
60
 Arguably, Article 3.7 of the DSU does not embrace the idea that the 
exercise of such judgment shall be undertaken within specific limits.  
 
As noted by the panel, Guatemala and Peru disagreed “about the scope of the findings” 
of the Appellate Body in Mexico – Corn Syrup with respect to Article 3.7 of the DSU.61 
In that case the Appellate Body recalled its Report in European Communities – 
Bananas, pointing out that the language of Article 3.7 of the DSU suggests that a 
Member is expected to be “largely self-regulating” in deciding whether bringing a case 
would be “fruitful”.62 Against this background, Guatemala considered that the Appellate 
Body “clearly found that a panel cannot question a Member’s exercise of judgement as 
to whether the initiation of a dispute settlement procedure would be fruitful”. By 
contrast, Peru maintained that, “despite the existence of a presumption, that 
presumption is rebuttable.”63 Even if we agree with Peru that such presumption may be 
rebuttable, taking into account the international jurisprudence favoring the presumption 
of good faith, it is less clear how a WTO Member may rebut such a strong presumption. 
 
Importantly, although the Appellate Body referred to the “largely self-regulating” 
character of Article 3.7 of the DSU,
64
 it also clarified that “the considerable deference 
accorded to a Member’s exercise of its judgement in bringing a dispute is not entirely 
unbounded.”65 In our view, this precision is relevant in that it gives room to distinguish 
between the presumption of good faith and the judicial review of a Member’s conduct 
when engaging in WTO dispute settlement proceedings. It is worth observing, in this 
regard, that it is one thing to presume that a Member acts in good faith when it exercises 
its judgment as to whether bringing a case to the WTO would be “fruitful”, and another 
to argue that this presumption leads to that judgment being exempt from judicial review.  
 
As noted by Cheng, in a great number of cases the law allows a state broad discretion in 
the exercise of a right, but “wherever the law leaves a matter to the judgment of the 
person exercising the right, this discretion must be exercised in good faith, and the law 
will intervene in all cases where this discretion is abused.”66  In essence, Article 3.7 of 
the DSU follows the same interpretation, since Members certainly have broad discretion 
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with respect to the decision whether bringing a claim “would be fruitful”, but there is at 
the same time the need that such a judgment be conducted in good faith.  
 
Accordingly, the presumption of good faith in Article 3.7 is not at odds with the judicial 
review thereof.  It is upon the party that questions the conduct of a state that rests the 
burden of proof and the difficult task of rebutting the presumption of good faith. Very 
few examples can be provided in this respect. Bartels, for instance, suggests that a WTO 
Member might not be acting in good faith if it requested the establishment of a panel 
“for the purpose of nullifying the substantive rights of another WTO Member”.67 How 
to prove such purpose is the difficulty for a state. Another example is when a Member 
has “relinquished, by virtue of a mutually agreed solution in a particular dispute, its 
right to have recourse to WTO dispute settlement in respect of that dispute.”68 However, 
as evidenced in EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador II/ Article 21.5 – US) and 
Peru – Agricultural Products, it might be a very difficult task to prove such an 
agreement, and, in any event, “greater scrutiny” might be necessary to rebut the 
presumption of good faith.
69
  
 
2.3.2. The high threshold for rebutting the presumption of good faith in 
Articles 3.7 and 3.10 of the DSU 
 
One of the main difficulties of invoking Articles 3.7 and 3.10 of the DSU as a defense 
in WTO dispute settlement proceedings is the high threshold required to rebut the 
presumption of good faith. From the outset, it is worth observing that the Appellate 
Body in Peru – Agricultural Products based its analysis on a narrow interpretation of 
Articles 3.7 and 3.10, when it stated that it was called upon to determine whether 
Guatemala acted contrary to good faith only on account of an alleged relinquishment of 
Guatemala’s right to challenge the PRS before the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism.
70
 Hence, the Appellate Body did not explore other possible means in which 
Guatemala could have initiated the proceedings in breach of the principle of good faith. 
The Appellate Body recalled that the panel did not find “any reason to take other 
situations into consideration, given that no evidence suggested that Guatemala had 
engaged in this procedure with the intention of causing injury to another Member, or 
impairing its rights.”71 
 
The question of the threshold required to prove that a Member has relinquished its right 
to have recourse to WTO dispute settlement proceedings was addressed by the 
Appellate Body in EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador II/ Article 21.5 – US). In 
that case, the Appellate Body determined whether the Understandings on Bananas, 
which had been notified to the Dispute Settlement Body as a “mutually agreed 
solution”, contained a waiver by the parties of their right to have recourse to compliance 
proceedings under Article 21.5 of the DSU. The Appellate Body concluded that “the 
relinquishment of rights granted by the DSU cannot be lightly assumed”, and that “the 
language in the Understandings must clearly reveal that the parties intended to 
                                                 
67
 Mitchell (n 4) 355-56, citing Lorand Bartels, ‘The Separation of Powers in the WTO: How to Avoid 
Judicial Activism’ (2004) 53 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 890. 
68
 Peru – Agricultural Products, Report of the Appellate Body, para. 5.19. 
69
 ibid. 
70
 Peru – Agricultural Products, Report of the Appellate Body, para. 5.25. 
71
 ibid, para. 5.20. 
14 
 
relinquish their rights”.72 Bearing in mind the legal effect of any relinquishment of 
rights, such relinquishment requires a thorough analysis of the provisions of the 
international legal instrument at issue in order to ensure that the rights of the state are 
not unduly affected.    
 
Importantly, these criteria were taken into account by the Appellate Body in the Peru – 
Agricultural Products case.
73
 Contrary to what Peru claimed, the Appellate Body held 
that it does not appear that paragraph 9 of Annex 2.3 to the FTA reflects the will of 
Guatemala to relinquish its right to initiate WTO dispute settlement proceedings with 
respect to the PRS. Aside from the requirement of consistency between a claim related 
to good faith and WTO law, an issue that will be discussed below, the Appellate Body 
pointed out two aspects that reflect the lack of a stipulation that clearly expresses a 
relinquishment of Guatemala’s right to initiate WTO dispute settlement proceedings. On 
the one hand, it observed that the participants raised conflicting arguments on how to 
read paragraph 9 of Annex 2.3 to the FTA, and that there appears in this regard to be 
ambiguity as to whether even the FTA itself allows Peru to maintain the PRS if it is 
found to be WTO-inconsistent.
74
 These arguments will also be discussed below. On the 
other hand, it considered relevant that Peru itself recognized that Guatemala was not 
“procedurally barred from bringing a WTO claim against the PRS.”75  
 
The aforementioned reasons stated by the Appellate Body reflected, in this case, the 
difficulties in proving the existence of a solution that “clearly reveals” the intention of a 
WTO Member to waive its right to initiate proceedings before the WTO. This 
circumstance greatly limits the possibility to rebut the presumption of good faith in the 
decision of a Member to bring a case to the WTO dispute settlement system.  
 
Notably, the possibility to bring a claim with regard to other good faith obligations 
under Article 3.10 of the DSU is also limited by the high threshold that is required to 
rebut the presumption of good faith. It might be noted, for example, that Article 3.10 
involves the Members’ obligation to “remain open to resolution” of their dispute, and 
that this obligation might be breached by actions “such as refusing to meet with a 
Member that has requested consultations or refusing to participate in proceedings”76  
 
From an overall perspective in international law, Peru has indeed experienced a case in 
which it failed to prove a breach of the principle of good faith relating to the obligation 
to negotiate. In the Tacna-Arica question case, Peru and Chile initiated arbitration 
aimed at overcoming the difficulties surrounding the unfulfilled stipulations of Article 3 
of the Treaty of Peace of October 20, 1883.
77
 The arbitrator was asked to decide 
whether a plebiscite should be held “to determine the definite sovereignty of the 
territory in question as between Chile and Peru” and, if so, to determine the conditions 
of that plebiscite.
78
 Peru contended that Chile “willfully prevented the timely holding of 
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a plebiscite” and that “her action in the course of her administration of the territory 
constituted a perversion of the conditions essential to the plebiscite as contemplated by 
the treaty”. Consequently, Peru argued that Chile prevented the performance of Article 
3 of the Treaty of Peace and claimed that the plebiscite should not take place.
79
 
 
What is relevant in this case is that Peru questioned the good faith of Chile in relation to 
efforts to reach an agreement on a plebiscite, and with respect to her administration of 
the territory of the provinces of Tacna and Arica.  
 
With respect to the former, the arbitrator noted that, as the Parties agreed to enter into a 
special protocol, but did not fix its terms, “their undertaking was in substance to 
negotiate in good faith to that end, and it would follow that a willful refusal of either 
Party so to do would have justified the other Party in claiming discharge from the 
provision.”80 However, the arbitrator introduced an important caveat in the sense that 
the agreement to make a special protocol with undefined terms “did not mean that either 
Party was bound to make an agreement unsatisfactory to itself provided it did not act in 
bad faith.” Accordingly, “bad faith is not to be predicated upon the refusal of ratification 
of a particular proposed protocol deemed by the ratifying authority to be 
unsatisfactory”.81 The arbitrator, in particular, required a high threshold to rebut the 
presumption of good faith when it stated that there must be found “an intent to frustrate 
the carrying out of the provisions of Article 3” and “the purpose to prevent any 
reasonable agreement for a plebiscite”. Furthermore, it held that a finding of the 
existence of bad faith should be supported “by clear and convincing evidence.”82 
 
With regard to the Chilean administration of Tacna and Arica, it is important to observe 
that, although the arbitrator disapproved some of the measures and policies adopted by 
Chile with respect to the Peruvian population, it found no reason to conclude that a fair 
plebiscite could not be held under proper conditions.
83
 The arbitrator held in this regard 
that, for administrative abuses to terminate the agreement, it would be necessary to 
establish such serious conditions resulting from administrative wrongs as “would 
operate to frustrate the purpose of the agreement”.84 This line of reasoning reflects the 
boundaries of the principle of good faith in international dispute settlement. It might be 
observed, in particular, that even if conduct could be deemed to be contrary to the good 
faith obligations of the state, the circumstances may be nuanced by the necessity to 
balance such a breach with the ultimate aim of preserving the international obligations 
of the parties in dispute.  
 
It is also illustrative to note that in MERCOSUR, for example, arbitral tribunals have 
conceptualized the principle of good faith and restricted the possibility of charging 
states over a violation of such a principle. Indeed, arbitral tribunals have asserted that a 
breach of a rule does not imply that such a state has acted in bad faith.
85
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Act, the Appellate Body also noted that “[n]othing, however, in the covered agreements 
supports the conclusion that simply because a WTO Member is found to have violated a 
substantive treaty provision, it has therefore not acted in good faith. In our view, it 
would be necessary to prove more than mere violation to support such a conclusion.”86 
 
2.4.Good faith and the requirement of consistency with the WTO covered 
agreements 
 
The principle of good faith is ultimately related to specific rights and obligations under 
international law, and is to some extent dependent of the meaning and scope thereof. 
But good faith obligations may also relate to the legal underpinnings of a particular 
legal system. This is no less true in the case of the WTO dispute settlement system. In 
spite of the open-textured nature of Articles 3.7 and 3.10 of the DSU, the good faith 
obligations envisaged in these provisions must necessarily be read in accordance with 
the general principles of the WTO law system. Article 3.7 of the DSU is even explicit in 
this regard when it states that a solution “mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute 
and consistent with the covered agreements” is clearly to be preferred. 
 
It is in light of the foregoing that the Appellate Body held in Peru – Agricultural 
Products that paragraph 9 of Annex 2.3 to the FTA does not appear a solution mutually 
acceptable to the parties to the dispute within the terms of Article 3.7 of the DSU, since, 
for such a finding, it would be necessary to determine that the provision in the FTA is 
“consistent with the covered agreements.”87 The Appellate Body recalled that it had 
found that the additional duties resulting from the PRS are “inconsistent with Article 4.2 
of the Agreement on Agriculture and Article II:1 (b) of the GATT 1994.”88 Therefore, 
Peru was prevented from relying on paragraph 9 of Annex 2.3 to the FTA to assert that 
Guatemala infringed its good faith obligations when it engaged in WTO dispute 
settlement proceedings in order to question the additional duties resulting from the PRS. 
 
As noted by Panizzon, the Appellate Body has only acknowledged claims of good faith 
when the claims have strengthened the trade liberalization obligations of the WTO 
Agreements. In this respect, “by way of being adopted with the reservation that it will 
not be applied by the WTO judiciary unless it supports the goals and objectives of the 
WTO Agreements, namely progressive and multilateral trade liberalization, good faith 
has only a one-dimensional content in WTO law.”89 
 
The issue of potential conflicts of norms relating to the good faith obligations of the 
states raises important questions with regard to the harmonization of legal regimes in 
international law. These questions are embedded within the discussion of the 
fragmentation of international law and, for reasons of space, are not fully addressed in 
this work. Notwithstanding this, it might be noted that international law “is built upon 
the principle of good faith and the presumption that states, when they conclude 
agreements, do keep in mind the obligations that they have undertaken in other fora and 
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thus will avoid agreements which would lead to breaching their obligations deriving 
from other agreements.”90 This implies that “international obligations of a state can be 
interpreted in a way that accommodates all obligations of a given state in a harmonious 
manner.”91 Importantly, the Appellate Body in Peru – Agricultural Products held that 
“there appears to be ambiguity as to whether even the FTA itself, regardless of its legal 
status, allows Peru to maintain the PRS if it is found to be WTO-inconsistent,”92 and 
also took this circumstance into account when asserting that Guatemala did not act in a 
way contrary to its good faith obligations under the DSU when it decided to bring the 
case to the WTO. As we will also see, the Appellate Body approach towards the 
principle of prevalence of FTA law over WTO rules as provided for in the FTA stressed 
the ambiguity of Article 1.3 of the FTA as to whether it permitted Peru to maintain a 
WTO-inconsistent PRS . 
 
2.5.Linking good faith obligations under the DSU with other good faith 
standards in international law: the requirement of a “legal hook”  
 
In the case under discussion, Peru argued that Guatemala infringed its good faith 
obligations under Article 18 of the VCLT because “bringing a case aimed at the 
dismantlement of the PRS ‘would eviscerate’ paragraph 9 of Annex 2.3 to the FTA, 
leaving it inoperative”, and “would constitute an action tending to defeat the object and 
purpose of the FTA”.93 In Peru’s view, “any action that implies bringing a case contrary 
to good faith is prohibited” under Article 3.10 of the DSU, and this includes the case of 
an action that “diametrically contradicts what has been agreed in a free trade 
agreement.”94 
 
However, the panel and the Appellate Body did not apply Article 18 of the VCLT in the 
case as a means to determine whether Guatemala had breached its good faith obligations 
when it initiated the WTO dispute settlement proceedings. The panel argued that its task 
was “circumscribed by the terms of reference conferred upon it by the DSU.”95 
Accordingly, the panel considered that it was “only authorized to rule on the invocation 
of any rule of public international law applicable to the relations between the parties to 
the extent that the invocation of that rule of international law is based on a relevant 
provision of the covered agreements that has been invoked by one of the parties to the 
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dispute.”96 The panel held in this regard that it was not necessary to rule on the 
applicability of the obligation set forth in Article 18 of the VCLT.
97
 Yet, the panel 
stated that it was “not convinced that the violation by a Member of the obligation 
contained in Article 18 of the Vienna Convention with respect to a treaty that does not 
form part of the WTO covered agreements can constitute evidence of lack of the good 
faith required by Articles 3.7 and 3.10 of the DSU.”98 It further argued that “Peru’s 
argument would require it to be shown that Guatemala’s action, in initiating the present 
procedure, constitutes an act which has the effect of defeating the object and purpose of 
the FTA,” a task that would go beyond the panel’s terms of reference entrusted by the 
DSB.
99
 
 
Hence, a violation of non-WTO obligations cannot necessarily mean that the WTO 
Member acted contrary to the principle of good faith as regards the fulfillment of WTO 
covered agreements. It follows that the violation of non-WTO rules cannot serve as the 
basis for the determination of a breach of the good faith obligations of a WTO Member 
State under the WTO covered agreements. In a broader context, and recalling the 
MERCOSUR ruling cited above, the infringement of international obligations cannot 
form the basis for invoking the violation of the principle of good faith. 
 
The Appellate Body, in turn, did not see a reason to engage further with Peru's argument 
that, by agreeing in the FTA to the maintenance of the PRS and thereafter challenging it 
in the proceedings, Guatemala acted inconsistently with its obligation under Article 18 
of the VCLT.
100
 The Appellate Body based its position on the fact that Peru neither 
elaborated on the object and purpose of the FTA, nor demonstrated how maintaining the 
PRS forms part thereof.
101
 
 
All in all, it is worth mentioning that both the panel and the Appellate Body undertook 
their analysis of good faith within the meaning and scope of Articles 3.7 and 3.10 of the 
DSU. This approach is consistent with the panel and Appellate Body mandate under the 
DSU. Arguably, these DSU provisions play the role of “legal hooks” in order to explore 
the possibility to bring and consider other expressions of good faith under general 
international law. Thus, the good faith obligation prescribed in Article 18 of the VCLT 
not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty not yet in force can only be assessed in 
the WTO law context subject to the good faith obligations of the Members under that 
legal system.      
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II. The relationship between WTO and RTA law: lessons from the Peru-Agricultural 
Products case 
 
1. The relationship between WTO and RTA law and the question of prevalence 
in the event of conflict of norms 
 
One facet of the continuing debate over the relationship between WTO and regional 
trade agreements (RTAs) is the hierarchy of one legal system over the other. Article 
XXIV of the GATT allows the establishment of an FTA or customs union. However, 
the said Article is silent on the matter of its relationship with such agreements. Article 
XXIV of the GATT introduces some requirements for the establishment of RTAs 
without clarifying, in some instances, their scope. For example, the exact meaning of 
the terms “substantially all the trade” remains unsettled and there exist other 
ambiguities such as the scope of the concept “other restrictive regulations of 
commerce”.102  
 
In a broader context, the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade 
Organization does not address its relationship with other international agreements nor 
does it deal with how to resolve a conflict between WTO agreements and other 
international agreements such as RTAs. Likewise, the DSU does not encompass a 
specific provision stating the primacy of the WTO covered agreements over other 
international agreements when a dispute arises. Recourse to the general rules of 
interpretation of international law and the VCLT has been made in order to analyze the 
relationship between WTO agreements and RTAs. On this matter, opinion is divided as 
to whether WTO law prevails over RTAs in the event of any inconsistency
103
 and 
whether RTAs may be considered as modifications of WTO agreements.
104
 WTO 
Members issued a political declaration of the primacy of the multilateral trading system 
in Singapore in 1996.
105
 Interestingly, some international attempts to condition the 
application of international agreements upon the consistency with WTO rules have not 
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succeeded. In this sense, the negotiations held during the 2002 World Summit on 
Sustainable Development serve as an example of the reluctance of states to recognize 
the supremacy of WTO rules over other international agreements.
106
 
 
It is worth observing that there are some international agreements which contain 
provisions concerning their hierarchical relationship with other international 
agreements. More importantly, they even provide for the supremacy of their rules over 
other international agreements
107
 or the supremacy of other international agreements 
over them.
108
 
 
Notably, some RTAs do not provide for any rule concerning the hierarchy between such 
agreements over other international agreements signed by their members. Nonetheless, 
the dispute settlement bodies established under those RTAs have been confronted with 
the question of prevalence of WTO law over RTA provisions and have taken a position 
regarding such relationship.
109
 In this connection, a regional tribunal such as the Andean 
Community Court of Justice (hereinafter ACJ) takes the view that in the event of any 
conflict between the Andean legal order and WTO law, the former should prevail. The 
immediate effect of this supremacy of Andean Community law is that the conflicting 
WTO provision becomes inapplicable.
110
  
 
Another noteworthy point concerns the responsibility of states when their regional 
tribunals such as the ACJ apply the principle of primacy of RTA rules over WTO law. 
In essence, although the ACJ has explicitly declared that Andean law prevails over 
WTO rules, as Reyes Tagle points out: “The ACJ accepts that states have a 
responsibility if they fail to comply with international norms. It does not deny the 
competence of the WTO dispute settlement system but it will not accept that the 
application of Andean law be conditioned upon its compatibility with WTO rules.”111 
Indeed, following the ACJ´s stance, even if one Andean member decides on the 
preferred application of Andean law disregarding WTO law, such a member remains 
liable within the framework of the WTO.  
 
Similarly, in MERCOSUR, the Permanent Tribunal of Review (PTR) has not hesitated 
to affirm that MERCOSUR law shall prevail over public or private international law of 
all Member States regardless of whether such law was adopted before or after 
MERCOSUR law. Furthermore, the PTR has rejected the infringement of MERCOSUR 
law by Member States based on a bilateral, multilateral or any kind of international 
agreement.
112
 In light of this opinion, the PTR, therefore, will not accept the violation of 
MERCOSUR law to apply a WTO rule by MERCOSUR Member States. The 
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prevalence of MERCOSUR law over national and international rules is seen as a 
characteristic of the legal system.  
 
Yet, the hierarchical relationship between RTA law and WTO rules has not been 
explicitly settled in other RTAs although their regional courts were faced with such a 
question. For instance, in the European Union (EU) as regards the relationship between 
EU law and WTO rules, Laurence and Alter observe that,  
“The ECJ has also considered the relationship between Community rules and 
WTO law. In contrast to the ATJ [ACJ], however, the ECJ has refused to decide 
whether WTO treaties trump Community rules. For example, when Germany 
invoked the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to challenge the 
EC’s banana imports regime, the ECJ did not resolve the compatibility of the 
two legal regimes.”113  
 
They went on to add that: “…the hierarchical relationship between Community law and 
WTO treaties remained unresolved”.114 But still, the ECJ has not denied the 
responsibility of the EU within the framework of the WTO.  
 
On balance, any RTA provision approved by WTO Members in their bilateral or 
regional negotiations which is WTO-inconsistent will affect the manner in which WTO 
Members abide by their multilateral obligations but the responsibility is exclusively for 
the WTO Members.    
 
Another observation is that within the context of RTAs, in the absence of specific rules 
on the relationship between RTAs and other international agreements, some RTA 
members have also taken up a position concerning such a relationship, supporting the 
primacy of WTO agreements over RTAs. For example, Reyes Tagle explains that in the 
Viagra case, “brought against Peru before the ACJ, Peru invoked the TRIPS Agreement 
[Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights] to argue that 
second use patents, which were allowed under Peruvian law, were consistent with the 
[said] Agreement. Strangely, Peru…claimed before the ACJ that the Andean 
Community was violating the TRIPS Agreement as regards the granting of second use 
patents”. In sum, Peru requested the ACJ to declare the incompatibility between Andean 
law and the WTO rules.
115
 The Peruvian argument favored the application of WTO law 
over Andean law considering that the latter was incompatible with the former. Reyes 
Tagle adds that Ecuador and Venezuela (former Andean member) shared the Peruvians’ 
thoughts on the applicability of the TRIPS Agreement.
116
 The ACJ rejected those 
arguments. On the other hand, in the MERCOSUR context, Argentina argued that when 
a subject matter has been regulated in MERCOSUR with norms which go beyond WTO 
obligations, MERCOSUR provisions shall prevail over WTO law.
117
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2. The enshrinement of the principle of prevalence of FTA provisions over 
GATT/WTO law rules in FTAs 
 
In the era of FTAs, the assessment of the impact of the obligations assumed by the 
states under the framework of an FTA over WTO law cannot be denied. Some FTAs 
between WTO Members have included a provision enshrining the precedence of FTA 
provision over GATT/WTO rules in case of conflict between the legal regimes. The 
pertinent question is what the relationship is between such FTA provisions and the 
WTO rights and obligations in the WTO context.  
 
In this regard, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) articulates the 
principle that favors the application of NAFTA law over GATT/WTO rules. More 
specifically, Article 103 of the NAFTA
118
 provides that:  
“1. The Parties affirm their existing rights and obligations with respect to each 
other under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and other agreements 
to which such Parties are party.  
2. In the event of any inconsistency between this Agreement and such other 
agreements, this Agreement shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency, 
except as otherwise provided in this Agreement.”  
 
Similarly, Article 1.3 of the FTA between Peru and Guatemala mirrors Article 103 of 
the NAFTA concerning its relationship with the GATT/WTO Agreements and states 
that: 
 
“1. The Parties confirm their existing mutual rights and obligations under the 
WTO Agreement and other agreements to which they may be parties. 
2. In the event of any inconsistency between this Treaty and the agreements 
referred to in paragraph 1, this Treaty shall prevail to the extent of the 
inconsistency, unless otherwise provided in this Treaty.” 
 
Given the fact that some of the current FTAs that purport to address their relationship 
with WTO agreements contain similar, in some cases identical, priority clauses, it is 
relevant to understand the scope of their incorporation. Specifically, a review of some 
FTAs reveals that, for instance, Peru
119
 as well as other WTO Members
120
 has signed 
FTAs which have echoed the same principle. Under these clauses, exceptions are 
envisioned when a specific FTA provision itself provides for WTO priority over it. 
Taking into account the proliferation of FTAs, some of which may include similar 
priority clauses, it is not unlikely that the panel and Appellate Body may have to deal 
with more allegations of the existence of high ranking rights and obligations under the 
FTAs as a defense in deviating from WTO agreements.  
 
It is noteworthy that the approach adopted by some FTAs as regards their relationship 
with other international agreements, in particular with WTO law, differs from that of the 
FTA priority clauses abovementioned. Some FTA provisions recognize the potential 
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conflict or incompatibility that may arise between the said agreement and WTO rules 
but they do not take a position concerning which should prevail in the event of any 
inconsistency. Instead, these FTAs follow a model under which a provision is 
incorporated as regards the relationship of the said agreement with other international 
agreements, including the WTO. Such provision is usually divided into two paragraphs. 
After reconfirming the rights and obligations under WTO law in the first paragraph, the 
subsequent paragraph calls for consultations between the FTA parties in order to find a 
mutually satisfactory solution in the event of any incompatibility between the FTA 
provisions and the WTO agreements. Under this approach, however, no reference is 
made as to how such potential incompatibility will be resolved.
121
 Other FTAs follow a 
similar approach adding that the inconsistency will be dealt with in accordance with the 
general principles of international law,
122
 or the rules of interpretation of public 
international law.
123
  
 
Moreover, some FTA provisions declare the confirmation of rights and obligations 
under WTO and other international agreements,
124
 or call for the application of the FTA 
provisions without prejudice to the rights and obligations of the FTA Parties under the 
WTO Agreement.
125
 Nevertheless, those provisions surrounding the relationship 
between the FTA rules and WTO agreements afford no explicit consideration to the 
matter of how to resolve the potential existence of inconsistency between the said 
agreement and WTO agreements. 
 
 
3. The recognition of WTO agreements in the FTAs  
 
As mentioned above, some FTAs have incorporated a provision by which FTA parties 
recognize their WTO rights and obligations. The scope of such recognition is not 
completely settled. Charnovitz believes that NAFTA Article 103.1 is an incorporation 
of GATT's obligations by reference.
126
 Our contention, however, is that rather than an 
incorporation of GATT provisions, NAFTA Article 103.1 as well as Article 1.3.1 of the 
FTA between Peru and Guatemala may be interpreted as a statement of preservation of 
rights and obligations under GATT/WTO law, namely, that the FTA will not diminish 
such multilateral rights and obligations, unless the FTA explicitly provides for a 
withdrawal of such rights.
127
 Thus, the FTA reconfirms WTO rights and obligations. 
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First, there are other rules in the NAFTA and the FTA between Peru and Guatemala that 
explicitly incorporate GATT/WTO provisions showing the clear intention of the parties 
to abide by the same GATT/WTO framework as regards those specific matters.
128
 The 
number of incorporations of GATT/WTO rules and commitments in the FTA between 
Peru and Guatemala indicates that these countries have been receptive to the multilateral 
trading system. Second, bearing in mind the legal effect of incorporation of 
international agreements, the incorporation of GATT/WTO agreements into any FTA 
shall be explicit. The legislative practice adopted by FTAs by explicitly incorporating 
some WTO agreements implies that WTO agreements have become the legal standard 
with which FTA member states must comply. Such multilateral rules then can be 
invoked in their bilateral relations as part of the FTA rights and obligations. 
Consequently, WTO provisions have to be applied by virtue of their incorporation in the 
FTA legal framework. 
 
Therefore, NAFTA Article 103.1 as well as Article 1.3.1 of the FTA between Peru and 
Guatemala presupposes that the FTA provisions will not amount to a withdrawal of any 
right or obligation under the multilateral trading system. The use of the words “affirm” 
and “confirm” when referring to their rights and obligations under GATT/WTO 
agreements respectively supports this proposition.  
 
Another related point worth observing is that the first paragraph of the abovementioned 
FTA provisions does not address the question of hierarchical relationship between the 
FTA and the GATT/WTO. Such a question is addressed in the second paragraph. In this 
sense, paragraph 2 of both NAFTA Article 103 and Article 1.3 of the FTA between 
Peru and Guatemala reveals that the FTA parties were aware that, by creating rights and 
obligations within the framework of the FTA and recognizing that their GATT/WTO 
rights and obligations should be maintained, there could be a possible inconsistency 
between the international agreements. Article 103.2 and Article 1.3 in their second 
paragraph address this possibility using the terms “in the event of any inconsistency”. 
Article 1.3.2 of the FTA Peru and Guatemala is a conflict of law rule and predicates in 
an unambiguous way that, if an inconsistency between both legal systems arises, the 
FTA shall take precedence over the multilateral rules. Such recognition of prevalence 
has not been rendered in conditional terms.  
 
In sum, these FTAs are predicated on both core ideas: On the one hand, the maintenance 
of WTO rights and obligations, and, on the other hand, the recognition of potential 
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conflicts between international agreements and the FTA at issue, deciding in favor of 
the latter. 
 
4. The Peru- Agricultural Products case and the prevalence of an FTA provision 
over WTO rules 
 
4.1 The scope and effect of the principle of prevalence between FTA parties 
 
In Peru-Agricultural Products, the abovementioned Article 1.3 of the FTA between 
Peru and Guatemala was the subject of controversy. The question that arises is: how far 
can the normative primacy conferred by Article 1.3.2 go in the light of the WTO rights 
granted and obligations imposed in the WTO context? The parties to the dispute 
disagreed on whether this FTA provision permitted Peru to maintain a WTO-
inconsistent PRS. While Guatemala claimed that the Peruvian PRS was inconsistent 
with WTO rules, Peru resorted to Article 1.3.2 of the FTA as a defense to set aside 
WTO rules in order to maintain the PRS. 
 
In essence, Peru argued before the panel and Appellate Body that in the event of finding 
any inconsistency between the PRS and WTO law, the FTA between Peru and 
Guatemala should take precedence over WTO law. Peru went further and pointed out 
the consequences of such alleged prevalence. Peru held that “[i]n the presence of such 
inconsistency, by virtue of the provisions of its Article 1.3.2, the FTA would prevail. 
This would result in the modification, between the parties, of any provision of the WTO 
agreements that prohibits the PRS.”129 In essence, Peru favored the application of the 
FTA provisions.  
 
The parties also showed their disagreement concerning whether the FTA can modify 
WTO rules. In Guatemala´s view, “the FTA is not a legal vehicle for waiving or 
modifying rights and obligations contained in the WTO Agreement.”130 Arguably, 
regardless of whether an FTA can modify WTO rights and obligations, the FTA 
explicitly endorses the principle of prevalence of FTA provisions over WTO 
agreements, which can be construed as supporting the application of WTO-inconsistent 
measures under the FTA umbrella. 
 
First, Article 1.3.2 endorses the principle of prevalence of one agreement over another 
when both agreements are in force and applicable to the FTA parties. In Peru-
Agricultural Products, this requirement is not met since the FTA between Peru and 
Guatemala has not yet entered into force. 
 
Second, the question of modification of treaties differs from that of the principle of 
primacy of one agreement over another. This distinction has not been clearly made.  
Article 1.3 of the FTA does not specifically deal with the modification of international 
agreements but rather the broader question of the relationship between international 
agreements. Arguably, the application of the principle of primacy of the FTA over the 
WTO enshrined in such a provision does not require the modification of WTO law. 
Essentially, an inconsistency between both international agreements shall be ascertained 
in order to set aside the conflicting law (WTO law). There is, therefore, no need for a 
modification of the conflicting law in order for it to be disregarded. The recognition of 
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WTO rights and obligations in paragraph 1 of Article 1.3 of the FTA supports this 
interpretation. This paragraph reveals that the parties did not explicitly intend to modify 
WTO rules. 
 
Third, the immediate legal consequence of the application of the principle of prevalence 
contemplated in Article 1.3.2 is not the modification of WTO rights and obligations as 
Peru argued but rather the fact that the conflicting WTO law became inapplicable 
between the parties to the FTA. There is, as yet, no consensus as to whether such 
modification is even possible.
131
 
 
Meanwhile, it is important to distinguish between different categories of conflict of 
norms. In one case, namely, the rule prescribed in Article 53 of the VCLT, it is stated 
that in case of conflict between a treaty and a peremptory norm of general international 
law (jus cogens), the former becomes invalid. By contrast, when analyzing the impact 
of the priority clause endorsed by Article 103 of the UN Charter over the obligations 
subscribed to under other treaties, Koskenniemi explains that “[t]he lower-ranking rule 
is merely set aside to the extent that it conflicts with the obligation under Article 103.” 
He adds: “Yet the word ‘prevail’ does not grammatically imply that the lower-ranking 
provision would become automatically null and void, or even suspended. The State is 
merely prohibited from fulfilling an obligation arising under that other norm.”132 In this 
context, the treaty provision would be simply inapplicable to the extent of the conflict 
with the obligations under the UN Charter. 
 
The maintenance of a WTO-inconsistent measure is backed by the effect of Article 
1.3.2 itself. Relying on Koskenniemi´s understanding of the term “prevail” which has 
also been prescribed in the FTA between Peru and Guatemala, it is arguable that in 
application of the principle of prevalence, in case of conflict between WTO agreements 
and FTA rules, both Peru and Guatemala would be prevented from exercising their 
granted rights or fulfilling their obligations assumed under the WTO as between 
themselves only within the FTA framework. In fact, the recognition of a right to 
maintain a measure granted to a party under the FTA implies that the other FTA party 
will assume the obligation to respect the exercise of such right. Consequently, in the 
FTA context, Article 1.3.2 of the FTA supports a general right to maintain WTO-
inconsistent measures when those measures have been adopted in the light of the FTA 
rules. In spite of this effect of the principle of prevalence enshrined in the FTA, the 
application of this principle does not preclude WTO Members from exercising their 
rights in the WTO context as Peru understood when it argued that Guatemala acted 
contrary to the principle of good faith. Arguably, WTO rights and obligations have not 
been suspended.  
 
It should be stressed that the responsibility for any infringement of WTO law as a result 
of the inapplicability of WTO law as an outcome of the application of the principle of 
prevalence rests with the parties to the FTA.  
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Koskenniemi also notes that “Article 103 does not say that the Charter prevails, but 
refers to obligations under the Charter.”133 The FTA between Peru and Guatemala as 
well as Article 103 of the NAFTA declares that the Treaty/Agreement prevails in the 
event of inconsistency. Despite the difference in the manner in which Article 103 of the 
UN Charter has been couched, it is clear that the overall objective of the priority clauses 
embodied in the FTAs is that the obligations and rights under such agreements should 
prevail over those incorporated in the WTO agreements.  
 
There is also a substantial difference in the formulation of a provision seeking to 
abrogate international obligations from that of endorsing a principle of prevalence. 
Article 20 of the draft of the Covenant of the League of Nations is a case in point. The 
stricter approach taken in Article 20 of the draft of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations indicates the intention to repeal the obligations subscribed to by the Members 
of the League under other agreements. The first part of Article 20 thereof reads, in the 
relevant part: “The Members of the League severally agree that this Covenant is 
accepted as abrogating all obligations or understandings inter se which are inconsistent 
with the terms thereof…” This provision was the background to Article 103 of the UN 
Charter
134
 which embodied a different approach. By contrast, the wording of Article 
1.3.2 of the FTA between Peru and Guatemala presumes the priority of the FTA 
provisions and not the abrogation of WTO rules conflicting with it as between the FTA 
parties. The incorporation of the first paragraph of Article 1.3 and the preamble of the 
FTA also supports this proposition.  
 
Moreover, the effect of Article 103 of the UN Charter that Koskenniemi delineates 
resembles that of the impact of the principle of primacy elaborated by some RTA courts 
of justice as regards the relationship between two legal regimes. As mentioned above, 
the ACJ also considers that the effect of the application of the principle of primacy of 
Andean law over WTO rules is that the conflicting international law became 
inapplicable. There is, therefore, no modification of the conflicting international law.
135
 
 
In Peru-Agricultural Products, owing to the fact that the FTA was not in force, the 
panel avoided the heart of the matter related to the conceptual difference between the 
principle of primacy and treaty modification, by refraining from analyzing whether the 
FTA can modify the WTO agreements as between the FTA parties.  
 
 
4.2 The principle of prevalence and its relationship with other FTA provisions: the 
Appellate Body’s twofold approach 
 
Another related question concerning the principle of prevalence contemplated in Article 
1.3.2 of the FTA between Peru and Guatemala is its relationship with other FTA 
provisions. Interestingly, in Peru-Agricultural Products, both Peru and Guatemala took 
a different approach towards Article 1.3 of the FTA. While Guatemala relied on 
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paragraph 1 of the said Article to underscore that the parties to the FTA “confirm their 
rights and obligations under the WTO Agreement” and denied the existence of any 
conflict,
136
 Peru based its arguments on paragraph 2 to give life to the principle of 
prevalence of the FTA over WTO law. More concretely, the European Union held that 
paragraph 1 and 2 of Article 1.3 of the FTA between Peru and Guatemala embraces “an 
apparent contradiction”.137 
 
Additionally, in Peru-Agricultural Products, Guatemala argued that Article 1.3.1 should 
be read in conjunction with another provisions of the FTA such as paragraph 9 of 
Annex 2.3 to the FTA and concluded that the FTA “grants Peru the right to maintain the 
PRS for a limited number of products, without in any way affecting Peru's obligation to 
comply with the WTO Agreement”.138  
 
Moreover, the Appellate Body interpreted paragraph 1 and paragraph 2 of Article 1.3 of 
the FTA and took the view that  
 
“A reading of these provisions on their face reveals that it is not clear whether 
paragraph 9 of Annex 2.3, which states that Peru may maintain the PRS, should 
necessarily be construed as allowing Peru to maintain a WTO-inconsistent PRS, 
when read together with other provisions of the FTA.”139 
 
On top of that, the Appellate Body presented an additional argument and created a 
distinction between the application of the first and second paragraph of Article 1.3 
together with other FTA provisions. It pointed out that:  
“On the one hand, paragraph 9 of Annex 2.3 to the FTA, when read together 
with paragraph 2 of Article 1.3 of the FTA, seems to suggest that the FTA would 
prevail over WTO law to the extent that these provisions permit a WTO-
inconsistent PRS; on the other hand, when paragraph 9 of Annex 2.3 is read 
together with paragraph 1 of Article 1.3, which confirms the parties' WTO rights 
and obligations, it seems to suggest that the FTA would only permit a WTO-
consistent PRS.”140 
 
The Appellate Body links up the right to maintain the PRS with Article 1.3 but the 
twofold analysis developed by the Appellate Body does not match the nature and 
purpose of the incorporation of Article 1.3.2 of the FTA. Paragraph 2 is not independent 
of paragraph 1. First, Article 1.3.1 expresses the parties´ interest in respecting the 
international rights granted and obligations incumbent on them as parties to other 
treaties. By adding the second paragraph the FTA parties reveal the intention that such 
rights and obligations referred to in the first paragraph will not jeopardize the 
application of FTA provisions. In other words, although paragraph 1 preserves WTO 
rights and obligations, the incorporation of paragraph 2 shows that the FTA parties were 
aware that a potential conflict of norms may arise and adopted a stricter approach. Thus, 
when an inconsistency between an FTA provision and WTO agreements arises, 
paragraph 1 is no longer applicable but rather the more specific conflict rule enshrined 
in the second paragraph of Article 1.3. Article 1.3.2 of the FTA defines the applicable 
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law in case of conflict between international agreements. Therefore, as the panel and 
Appellate Body concluded that the Peruvian PRS was WTO-inconsistent, paragraph 1 
of the said Article should not be read in conjunction with paragraph 9 of Annex 2.3 to 
the FTA.  
  
Second, paragraph 1 is in line with the preamble of the FTA which states that Peru and 
Guatemala are resolved to “[build on] their respective rights and obligations under the 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, and other treaties to 
which they are parties”. However, paragraph 2 of Article 1.3 of the FTA contains a 
stronger language in favor of the prevalence of the FTA over WTO law in case of 
conflict and embodies an important principle, that the maintenance of WTO rights and 
obligations as recognized in paragraph 1 is subject to the compatibility of such rights 
and obligations with the FTA and not vice versa. Thus, if there is no compatibility, the 
explicit intent of the said Article is that the FTA shall prevail. In essence, Article 1.3 of 
the FTA departs from the approach adopted by Article 30 (2) of the VCLT which 
asserts that “[w]hen a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be 
considered as incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of that other 
treaty prevail.” Substantively, Article 1.6.2 of the FTA between the EFTA States and 
the Central American States echoed the approach taken by Article 30 (2) of the 
VCLT.
141
 
 
It is illustrative to mention that as regards the interpretation of NAFTA provisions, 
arbitral awards have deemed the coexistence of some general principles in NAFTA law, 
among them, the compatibility of NAFTA with GATT/WTO law and the priority of the 
NAFTA over the GATT/WTO in case of “direct conflict”142 without assuming any 
contradiction between these principles. Paragraph 1 of Article 1.3 should be read in 
conjunction with paragraph 2 of the said Article. In this context, the existence of a two-
tier-approach towards the relationship between the FTA provisions and WTO 
agreements does not imply any contradiction between the first and second paragraph of 
Article 1.3 of the FTA between Peru and Guatemala. The same conclusion is applicable 
to Article 103 of the NAFTA. 
 
Furthermore, some observations are called for relating to the manner in which the 
Appellate Body framed the scope of Article 1.3 together with other FTA provisions. 
Paragraph 9 of Annex 2.3 to the FTA does not explicitly condition the maintenance of 
the Peruvian PRS upon its compatibility with WTO rules. Nor does it affect the 
obligation of Peru to comply with WTO law. However, paragraph 9 of Annex 2.3 is not 
immune to the impact of Article 1.3.2 of the FTA.  
 
Paragraph 9 of Annex 2.3 to the FTA is not the specific FTA provision dealing with 
how to resolve the conflict between an FTA provision and WTO law. Indeed, it follows 
from the wording of paragraph 9 of Annex 2.3 to the FTA that a right has been granted 
to Peru. This provision does not make any assumption as regards the compatibility or 
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incompatibility of the PRS with WTO law when recognizing such a right. In this 
context, regardless of such compatibility or incompatibility, Guatemala accepted that 
Peru could maintain the PRS within the framework of the FTA. Therefore, such an FTA 
provision cannot be employed to assess whether Peru is authorized to maintain a WTO-
inconsistent PRS in the light of the FTA. 
 
The Appellate Body relied on the existence of Article 1.3.1 but greater attention should 
be paid to the exact scope of the principle of prevalence articulated in Article 1.3.2 of 
the FTA. Indeed, the immediate outcome of the application of such a principle is that in 
the event of conflict between both legal regimes, a WTO-inconsistent measure could be 
maintained. Otherwise, the incorporation of the principle of prevalence will be 
meaningless. Hence, paragraph 9 of Annex 2.3 when read together with Article 1.3.1 of 
the FTA need not be construed as allowing Peru to maintain a WTO-inconsistent PRS, 
it is rather Article 1.3.2 that does. The principle of prevalence could be presumed to be 
accessorial to rights established in the FTA. This presumption is strengthened because 
this principle does not constitute an independent, substantial basis for a claim. The 
prevalence of FTA provisions cannot be invoked and applied unless an inconsistency 
has been found between the rights granted by the FTA and the obligations conferred by 
WTO agreements. If the Peruvian PRS contemplated in paragraph 9 of Annex 2.3 to the 
FTA is found to be inconsistent with WTO law, then the application of Article 1.3.2 
comes into play inasmuch as this provision relates to the rights and obligations under 
the FTA vis-à-vis non-FTA rules. Hence, this principle grants a defense to FTA parties 
to enforce between themselves WTO-inconsistent measures within the framework of the 
FTA only.  
 
Article 1.3 of the FTA is an expression of the interests of FTA parties in not only 
maintaining their multilateral rights and obligations but also, and above all, enforcing 
and protecting their bilateral legal framework. The fact that this Article was not drawn 
with a significantly qualified formulation when endorsing the principle of prevalence 
supports this proposition.
143
  
 
In light of the foregoing, Article 1.3.2 permits the maintenance of the WTO-inconsistent 
PRS as between the FTA parties. In other words, since the FTA prevails over WTO-
inconsistent rules, to the extent that the FTA accords Peru the right to maintain the PRS, 
the FTA should govern relations between the parties. However, such application of the 
PRS is limited to the FTA sphere of competence. And for the reasons discussed above, 
the principle of supremacy over the WTO does not terminate or suspend WTO rights 
and obligations within the WTO framework. 
 
It should be mentioned that the decision adopted in the WTO has an impact on the 
scope of rights and obligations as between the FTA parties. Guatemala´s claims focused 
on challenging a right that Guatemala itself recognized to Peru in the FTA resorting to 
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WTO law. Although, as Guatemala correctly argued, such a Peruvian right did not 
affect the obligations of Peru in the WTO context, from an FTA perspective, the Peru-
Agricultural Products case reveals that the rights derived from an FTA provision are not 
immune to the WTO dispute settlement system as between the FTA parties. Under such 
a premise, all the rights granted by the FTA as between the parties may be questioned in 
the WTO in the light of, and to the extent of the inconsistency with, the WTO 
agreements so as to invalidate a concession in practice. The effect of the panel and 
Appellate Body decision that such a right (the maintenance of the PRS) is WTO 
inconsistent is relevant from an FTA perspective. Peru can no longer enforce its right 
acquired through the FTA provision in the FTA context. Therefore, this will amount to 
an unforeseen de facto modification of the FTA provision through a panel and Appellate 
Body decision. This outcome renders the incorporation of a principle of prevalence of 
FTA provisions over WTO agreements meaningless.  
 
There is no doubt that the PRS represents one of the concessions made by Guatemala 
during the negotiations. The underlying logic behind Guatemala´s acceptance of the 
Peruvian PRS is not clear. If an FTA is an agreement for recognition of mutual rights 
and obligations which are to be enforced between the parties, a question of security and 
predictability within the FTA framework arises to the extent that although an FTA party 
may be granted a right, such right may be overruled by one party employing the WTO 
system. The legal remedies to avoid these actions may have to be developed within the 
FTA framework.  
 
4.3. The role and function of the panel in the dispute settlement system 
 
To begin with, Article 3.2 of the DSU states three objectives of the dispute settlement 
system. As such, the system should provide security and predictability to the 
multilateral trading system. In US-Section 301, the panel emphasized that providing 
security and predictability is a “central object and purpose of the system which could be 
instrumental to achieving the broad objectives of the Preamble… DSU provisions must, 
thus, be interpreted in the light of this object and purpose and in a manner which would 
most effectively enhance it.”144 Moreover, the dispute settlement system is aimed at 
preserving the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements. 
Finally, it purports to “clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance 
with customary rules of interpretation of public international law.” 
 
Appendix 1 of the DSU lists the Agreements that are covered by the DSU, namely the 
Agreement Establishing the WTO, the Multilateral Trade Agreements and the 
Plurilateral Trade Agreements, although in the latter case it introduces some conditions 
for the application of the DSU. The dispute settlement system envisaged by Article 3 of 
the DSU is designed to protect the rights and ensure the obligations set out under the 
covered agreements only. WTO panels are not obliged to apply rules of non-WTO 
agreements. 
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The DSU delineates the scope of the terms of references for panels with specific 
reference to the covered agreements. Paragraph 1 of Article 7 of the DSU defines such 
terms of references as follows:  
“Panels shall have the following terms of reference unless the parties to the 
dispute agree otherwise within 20 days from the establishment of the panel: 
"To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions in (name of the covered 
agreement(s) cited by the parties to the dispute), the matter referred to the DSB 
by (name of party) in document ... and to make such findings as will assist the 
DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in 
that/those agreement(s)." 
 
The DSU does not explicitly preclude a panel from examining claims under non-WTO 
agreements. However, a reading of the DSU reflects that in a WTO dispute claims shall 
be only based on the covered agreements. Furthermore, the Appellate Body in 
Guatemala-Portland Cement delineated the scope of the term “matter” included in 
Article 7.1 of the DSU. The Appellate Body resorted to Article 6.2 of the DSU in 
conjunction with Article 7.1 and concluded that “The "matter referred to the DSB", 
therefore, consists of two elements: the specific measures at issue and the legal basis of 
the complaint (or the claims).” It went on to add that “[t]aken together, the ‘measure’ 
and the ‘claims’ made concerning that measure constitute the ‘matter referred to the 
DSB’, which forms the basis for a panel's terms of reference.”145 Thus, the claims are to 
be examined in accordance with the WTO covered agreements referred to in paragraph 
1 of Article 7 of the DSU. 
 
If in a WTO dispute claims shall be only based on the covered agreements, as Article 
7.1 calls for, why should a defense of overlooking WTO obligations in a WTO dispute 
be examined under non-WTO covered agreements signed between the parties? More 
concretely, why should an FTA provision suffice to make WTO law inapplicable? 
Article 7.1 employs the language of “in the light of the relevant provisions in” the 
covered agreements implying that the examination of a measure brought to the attention 
of the panel and Appellate Body cannot be carried out under any other non-WTO 
agreement. In doing so, there is no legal grounds under the DSU to state that a defense 
of a WTO Member can be based on non-WTO agreements when the legal consequence 
will be the inapplicability of the WTO agreements.  
 
Paragraph 2 of Article 7 stipulates that “Panels shall address the relevant provisions in 
any covered agreement or agreements cited by the parties to the dispute.” This provision 
makes a distinction between the covered agreements and any other agreements cited by 
the parties. 
 
Moreover, paragraph 3 of Article 7 buttresses the approach adopted in paragraph 1 of 
Article 7 to the extent that “[i]n establishing a panel, the DSB may authorize its 
Chairman to draw up the terms of reference of the panel in consultation with the parties 
to the dispute, subject to the provisions of paragraph 1.” 
 
Article 11 of the DSU is worth noting. It confers three specific tasks on the WTO panel 
and frames its function on the application of the covered agreements. First, the panel has 
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to undertake an objective assessment of the matter and the facts of the case. Second, it 
has to assess the applicability of and conformity of the matter and the facts of the case 
with the relevant covered agreements. Third, the panel has to “make such other findings 
as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided 
for in the covered agreements”. These tasks are to be carried out in order to assist the 
DSB to comply with its obligations in accordance with the DSU and the covered 
agreements. As can be seen, the DSB is not obliged to make a decision in application of 
other agreements. Article 11 makes no reference to other non-WTO agreements and 
should not be interpreted as extending to such agreements.  
 
Nothing in Article 11 suggests that the function of the panel could be overridden in 
order to apply non-WTO agreements. In this sense, a priority clause in an FTA does not 
override the duties of the WTO panel pursuant to Article 11 of the DSU. 
 
In respect of the obligation of the panels, Cottier and Nadakavukaren Schefer point out 
that they “are called upon to declare whether national or regional rules, and the way they 
are applied, are compatible with those set out in the WTO agreements.”146 (emphasis in 
original). They go on to add that “[t]he task of WTO panels, however, does primarily 
consist of construing WTO rules and deciding if the results produced on the basis of 
national or regional law are consistent with such obligations.”147 Thus, the WTO panels 
should endeavor to assess whether any measure adopted by a WTO Member complies 
with the covered agreements. Arguably, the DSU does not entrust the panel with the 
assessment of whether non-WTO agreements should be applied or not. 
 
 
4.4. The principle of prevalence of FTA provisions over WTO law as a defense in the 
WTO context 
 
After determining that Article 1.3.2 of the FTA allows the maintenance of a WTO-
inconsistent PRS within the FTA context, a relevant question is what the impact of 
Article 1.3 of the FTA is in the WTO context. In other words, the analysis turns on the 
relationship between Article 1.3 of the FTA and WTO agreements. Can Article 1.3 of 
the FTA be invoked within the WTO dispute settlement system as a defense to set aside 
WTO agreements? Can the WTO-inconsistent PRS be enforceable within the WTO on 
the grounds that Article 1.3 of the FTA has a prevailing legal force? Can FTA 
provisions be invoked before the panel and Appellate Body to claim the protection of 
rights acquired or the application of a principle recognized under an FTA as a defense? 
   
To address these questions, a review of the competence of the panel and Appellate Body 
and the applicable law in WTO disputes in the light of WTO law should be undertaken. 
A review of the DSU reveals that the panel and Appellate Body are obliged to apply the 
WTO covered agreements in any allegation of infringement of WTO rules.  
 
4.4.1 The allegation of Peru and the position of the panel and Appellate Body 
 
Another related question that arises is whether the WTO panel and Appellate Body can 
allow the application of an FTA provision as a defense to set aside WTO law and base 
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their decisions on an FTA provision. In Peru-Agricultural Products, Peru invoked 
Article 1.3.2 of the FTA as a defense before the WTO panel, arguing that in the event of 
inconsistency between the FTA and WTO agreements, the former should prevail. 
However, some legal aspects related to the Peruvian arguments deserve further analysis. 
It should be stressed from the outset that the FTA priority clause does not form part of 
the provisions of the covered agreements which WTO panels are bound to apply. Such a 
priority clause should govern the conduct of FTA parties only. Thus, the right to 
maintain a WTO-inconsistent measure is given under Article 1.3.2 of the FTA. Peru did 
not acquire any right as a consequence of such a priority clause under the covered 
agreements in the WTO context.  
 
Most significantly, the panel and Appellate Body can neither limit nor broaden the 
rights and obligations of WTO Members. Article 3.2 of the DSU demands that 
“[r]ecommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and 
obligations provided in the covered agreements.” Article 19.2 of the DSU covers the 
same ground as Article 3.2 thereof and is concerned with the panel and Appellate Body 
recommendations. This provision makes it clear that “[i]n accordance with paragraph 2 
of Article 3, in their findings and recommendations, the panel and Appellate Body 
cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered 
agreements.” In fulfilling this mandate, Marceau correctly stresses that “[t]his would 
thus seriously impede their capacity to reach a conclusion that a provision of another 
treaty has superseded a WTO provision.”148 In the same vein, Bartels shares the 
concerns on the subject and agrees that “Article 19.2 precludes a straightforward 
application in WTO dispute settlement proceedings of any rule that results in the 
disapplication of WTO law, including dispute settlement rights. This is essentially the 
point made in Mexico – Soft Drinks…”149 He raises the question as to the meaning of 
the terms “add to” or “diminish” WTO rights and obligations under Article 19.2 of the 
DSU and proposes that “this will occur when valid WTO rights and obligations are 
disapplied by virtue of a non-WTO rule”.150  
 
In Peru-Agricultural Products, the Appellate Body pronounced upon the utilization of 
FTA provisions and affirmed that “the consideration of provisions of an FTA for the 
purpose of determining whether a Member has complied with its WTO obligations 
involves legal characterizations that fall within the scope of appellate review under 
Article 17.6 of the DSU.” It emerges from this statement that the utilization of non-
WTO sources such as that of an FTA is carried out to comply with the panel and 
Appellate Body commitment, that is to say, the assessment of whether there is any 
breach of WTO law. 
 
Arguably, the recognition of rights granted or obligations conferred under an RTA in 
the WTO that would set aside WTO rules would breach Article 3.2 and 19.2 of the 
DSU. These rules explicitly impose an obligation on the DSB, as well as on the panel 
and Appellate Body to respect the commitments of WTO Members as provided for in 
the covered agreements. Permitting the panel or Appellate Body to add to or diminish 
WTO rights and obligations through their recommendations would jeopardize the 
predictability and security that the dispute settlement system seeks to ensure.  
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Since Peru breached Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture in light of the 
interpretation of the Appellate Body, allowing Peru to maintain the PRS in the WTO 
context would create a right for Peru so long as the Agreement on Agriculture forbids 
such PRS. Likewise, the Peruvian attempt to enforce Article 1.3.2 of the FTA would 
create a new right for Peru under the covered agreements inasmuch as the prevailing 
legal force of the FTA and its effects are not contemplated in the covered agreements. 
Marceau remarks that “[i]n the context of the WTO Agreement, it is not clear that WTO 
adjudicating bodies have the constitutional capacity to reach a conclusion that would 
lead de facto to an amendment of the WTO treaty.”151 In effect, and in light of the role 
and function of the panel explained above, it is arguable that Article 1.3.2 of the FTA 
together with paragraph 9 of Annex 2.3 to the FTA cannot be interpreted as allowing 
Peru to set aside WTO agreements in the WTO context. 
 
Furthermore, in Peru-Agricultural Products, the Appellate Body observed that “the 
WTO agreements contain specific provisions addressing amendments, waivers, or 
exceptions for regional trade agreements, [footnote omitted] which prevail over the 
general provisions of the Vienna Convention, such as Article 41”.152 Article 41 of the 
VCLT would make feasible the negotiation of agreements to modify multilateral treaties 
between certain of the parties only. In Peru-Agricultural Products, Peru relied on this 
provision.
153
 Pursuant to Article 41(1) (b) of the VCLT, the modification of a 
multilateral treaty is possible if “[t]he modification in question is not prohibited by the 
treaty”. This provision lays down two conditions, namely that the modification does not 
affect the rights of third WTO Members and that it is compatible with the effective 
execution of the object and purpose of the WTO agreements. 
 
As discussed above, under Article 3.2 and 19.2 of the DSU the panel and Appellate 
Body recommendations cannot modify the existing WTO rights and obligations by 
adding to or diminishing them. Clearly, Article 3.2 and 19.2 of the DSU do not prohibit 
inter se modifications as envisaged by Article 41 of the VCLT. Nonetheless, these 
provisions would prevent the panel or Appellate Body from accepting any request to 
brush aside the application of the WTO covered agreements on the basis of WTO-
inconsistent FTA provisions as a defense. 
 
Peru requested an interpretation of the Agreement on Agriculture in the light of the 
FTA. More precisely, Peru argued that “the Panel should have interpreted the term 
"shall not maintain" in Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture in the light of the 
provisions of the FTA between Peru and Guatemala as allowing Peru to maintain the 
PRS”.154 In essence, the question put to the Appellate Body thus involves an 
examination of whether an FTA provision can be employed as a valid defense to apply 
non-WTO norms which are contrary to WTO rules between the FTA parties only.  
 
The Peruvian argument is tantamount to an interpretation of the terms “shall not 
maintain” as “may maintain” the PRS. Applying the basic principle of interpretation 
that the words of a treaty, which by virtue of Article 31 of the VCLT are to be 
interpreted “in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
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terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”, the 
Appellate Body correctly dismissed the argument of Peru.
155
 
 
It is important to appreciate that the validity and enforcement of WTO law derives from 
its own legal system. It is an autonomous legal framework governing the relations 
between WTO Members. The application of WTO law is not conditioned upon its 
compatibility with FTA provisions. It is submitted that in the WTO context, the non-
application or enforcement of RTA provisions in the WTO legal order derives from the 
fact that the panel and Appellate Body do not have the competence to enforce or 
oversee the fulfillment of the international obligations assumed only by WTO Members 
within the framework of an RTA. It is not the mandate of the panel and Appellate Body 
to ensure the application of RTAs but rather WTO rules. The obligations of the WTO 
Members which are assumed within the framework of an FTA that they individually 
signed are not the responsibility of the WTO. Therefore, none of its institutions should 
intervene in the manner in which WTO Members live up to their international 
obligations within the framework of any RTA, unless an infringement of WTO law 
exists. 
 
WTO Members are still bound to comply with WTO law even when they enjoy some 
rights or assumed obligations under the RTAs. In MERCOSUR, an arbitral tribunal 
deemed that the prohibition of imports of retreaded tires imposed by Brazil was a breach 
of MERCOSUR law. The MERCOSUR arbitral tribunal award requested that Brazil 
comply with MERCOSUR law. Brazil adopted the so-called MERCOSUR exemption: 
imports from MERCOSUR countries were accepted. The EU complained in the WTO 
arguing that Brazil had infringed GATT provisions. In Brazil-Retreaded Tyres,
156
 the 
WTO Appellate Body Report concluded that there was a breach of GATT provisions. 
Brazil had to comply with the WTO decision and take steps to do so. The case reveals 
that WTO Members are bound to live up to their multilateral obligations even if their 
decisions are based on rights and obligations that they subscribed to under an RTA. 
 
It is heartening that in Peru-Agricultural Products,
157
 the Appellate Body reacted with 
caution to the Peruvian arguments by stating that:  
 “we express reservations as to whether the provisions of the FTA (in particular 
paragraph 9 of Annex 2.3), which could arguably be construed as to allow Peru 
to maintain the PRS in its bilateral relations with Guatemala, can be used under 
Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention in establishing the common intention of 
WTO Members underlying the provisions of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture and Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994. In our view, such an approach 
would suggest that WTO provisions can be interpreted differently, depending on 
the Members to which they apply and on their rights and obligations under an 
FTA to which they are parties.” 
 
This Appellate Body’s concern for the possibility of different interpretations of WTO 
rules offers explicit guidance that WTO rules are not to be interpreted differently 
depending on the number of international agreements that the Members have signed. In 
US-Section 301, the panel asserted that “[o]f all WTO disciplines, the DSU is one of the 
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most important instruments to protect the security and predictability of the multilateral 
trading system and through it that of the market place and its different operators.”158 
Any commitment made by the WTO Members in their external relations should not 
impinge on the WTO system. In such circumstances, allowing different interpretations 
of WTO law depending on the RTA in question goes against such predictability and 
security and contributes to fragmentation of the multilateral trading system itself.   
 
Therefore, in light of foregoing considerations, the panel would contradict Article 3.2 of 
the DSU if its recommendation to the DSB stated that Peru should be allowed to 
maintain a WTO-inconsistent PRS by virtue of Article 1.3.2 of the FTA, setting aside 
WTO Agreements.  
 
Interestingly, RTA tribunals have defended the integrity, security and uniform 
application of their own legal regimes. It is unlikely that such tribunals will permit 
different interpretations depending on the international agreement that the Member 
States have signed. For instance, in the Andean Community, Article 4 of the Statute of 
the Andean Court of Justice constitutes the legal basis for the standard of review of the 
ACJ. In this provision, it is explicitly stated that the ACJ is bound to ensure the uniform 
application and interpretation of Andean law in all the Member States. In line with the 
mandate of the ACJ to construe Andean law and ensure its uniform application, this 
Andean institution will not accept different interpretations of Andean law depending on 
the international agreement signed by the Member States, let alone the non-application 
of Andean law.  
 
It is noteworthy that Pauwelyn drew attention to the lack of an “inherent hierarchy” of 
treaties and found no justification to apply general international law while excluding the 
application of non-WTO treaties in WTO disputes.
159
 He makes a distinction between 
claims based on WTO rules and a defense based on non-WTO treaties. He proposes that 
bilateral agreements can be invoked as a defense to set aside WTO provisions.
160
 In his 
view, this approach is in tune with the idea that the WTO treaty is not “an island created 
and existing outside the sphere of international law”. He regarded his approach that 
WTO rules could be applied “differently to different WTO members depending on 
whether or not they have accepted other non-WTO rules” as a consequence of the lack 
of a “centralized legislator in international law”.161 
 
Cho expresses a difference of opinion concerning Pauwelyn´s proposal of an inter se 
modification of WTO norms to deal with the relationship between WTO and non-WTO 
provisions. Cho adds that:  
 
“No system is an island, and it is especially so in this highly integrated and 
interdependent world that we live in (globalization) as well as the very subject-
matter before us (international trade). Nonetheless, while the WTO interacts 
with, responds to, and is even influenced by its legal environment to remain 
open and linked, it must maintain its autonomy or “autopoietic” status by 
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upholding its legal integrity or “operative closure.”…What is inconsistent with 
the WTO rules cannot be WTO-legal through any devices such as inter se 
modifications.”162  
 
Although the WTO is not an island, neither is there a catch-all agreement. The same 
holds true as regards other legal orders such as that of RTA law. Indeed, the important 
point to note is that Pauwelyn´s approach differs from the case law developed by some 
RTA tribunals which have defended the autonomy of RTA law and rejected the 
argument that WTO agreements could be used as a defense to disregard it, as we will 
also see. 
 
4.4.2 WTO law as a defense in the court of justice of RTA tribunals 
 
The question that arises is why the panel and Appellate Body would have to recommend 
the DSB to admit a RTA provision as a defense to gloss over WTO law to protect the 
rights granted and the obligations conferred to their Members under such RTAs. 
Notably, regional tribunals follow a tougher approach when they face the question of 
utilization of WTO agreements as a defense to set aside RTA provisions. The practice 
of some RTA tribunals reveals that regional tribunals demand the unrestrictive 
application of their RTA law when the legality of such law is challenged vis-à-vis WTO 
law or when RTA members wish to employ WTO agreements as an exception to 
deviate from the obligations undertaken under the RTA.  
 
RTAs have interacted with the WTO in different ways. In this respect, for instance, 
RTA tribunals have not glossed over WTO rules and case law. It is worth observing that 
NAFTA arbitration under UNCITRAL rules awards have availed themselves of WTO 
case law to delimit the scope of some concepts established in the NAFTA.
163
 Also, the 
decision of the NAFTA panel in the Softwood Lumber case serves as an example of the 
utilization of WTO case law.
164
 NAFTA Article 102.2 affords consideration to the 
relevant matter of applicable law in the NAFTA and accepts the applicable rules of 
international law.
165
 The NAFTA Agreement makes repeated reference to the 
application of international law on a set of topics it addressed.
166
   
 
In MERCOSUR, arbitral tribunals have shown interest in referring, quoting and 
applying WTO case law in order to interpret the MERCOSUR legal order or to 
strengthen their interpretation as regards general principles of international law. For 
instance, in order to understand some concepts or decide on certain aspects such as the 
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extinction of a dispute as a consequence of the abrogation of a norm, MERCOSUR 
tribunals employed the 1995 WTO Analytical Index-Guide to WTO Law and 
Practice.
167
  
 
Moreover, when reviewing Article 3.2 of the DSU, in US-Gasoline the Appellate Body 
recognized the interaction between the multilateral trading system represented by the 
WTO and international law. It argues that the GATT “is not to be read in clinical 
isolation from public international law”.168 Similarly, RTA legal regimes have also 
recognized the role that international law played in the interpretation of such regimes. 
For instance, akin to the abovementioned NAFTA Article 102.2, Article 34 of the 
Protocol of Olivos defines the applicable law in MERCOSUR disputes and directs the 
ad hoc arbitral tribunals and the PTR to settle such disputes based on MERCOSUR law 
and also the applicable principles and provisions of international law. Likewise, arbitral 
tribunals have recognized that the applicability of MERCOSUR law shall take into 
account the norms and principle of international law in order to integrate them.
169
 In this 
sense, for instance, arbitral tribunals have regarded the WTO Antidumping Agreement 
as a reference point for the principles of international law mentioned in Article 34 of the 
Protocol of Olivos to shed light on the purpose of antidumping procedures.
170
 
MERCOSUR arbitral tribunals have also resorted to WTO law to ascertain the scope of 
some concepts in MERCOSUR law such as that of subsidies
171
 or employed the 
principles of international law to determine the scope of concepts such as 
controversy.
172
 
 
In the same vein, the ACJ regards public international law as a source of Andean 
community law.
173
 More relevantly, the WTO agreements are seen as a source of law in 
the Andean Community.
174
 In addition, in a study prepared by Reyes Tagle, she noted 
that, in its Ruling 2-AI-96, the ACJ accepted the importance of using TRIPS Agreement 
“as a means to provide important elements for the interpretation of intellectual property 
systems. It cited some of the provisions of this Agreement to back up its position”.175 
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Moreover, the same study found that in its Ruling 5-IP-90, “the ACJ observed that the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) helps explain the meaning of 
fundamental concepts incorporated in the Cartagena Agreement, such as commercial 
liberalization and trade restrictions, which are contrary to such liberalization”.176 
 
Being aware of this, it is fair to say that these RTAs such as the NAFTA, MERCOSUR 
and the Andean Community do not envisage the legal regimes that the RTAs 
established as isolated from public international law. RTA tribunals have treated WTO 
agreements or international law principles as reference points in their reasoning to frame 
the background of regional rules or to clarify some terms provided for in their legal 
regimes. However, although RTA tribunals also share the same thoughts as those 
expressed by the Appellate Body in US-Gasoline concerning the relationship between 
their legal regimes with international law, such recognition is not tantamount to an 
acceptance that WTO agreements or other international agreements could set aside their 
RTA law, even when those external agreements are invoked as a defense to disregard it. 
 
Moreover, some RTA tribunals have resorted to certain means in order to avoid a 
conflict between their RTA law and other international agreements binding for Member 
States, such as the WTO agreements. For instance, these jurisdictional bodies have 
developed and employed the concept of consistent interpretation. As regards the EU, 
Bronckers observes that “as long as a private litigant does not challenge the legality of 
EC measures on the basis of WTO law, the European courts show themselves quite 
willing to interpret EC (or, for that matter, national) measures as much as possible in 
conformity with WTO law”.177 In respect of the scope of the doctrine of consistent 
interpretation, the ECJ has held that: “…it should be recalled that Community 
legislation must, so far as possible, be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with 
international law, in particular where its provisions are intended specifically to give 
effect to an international agreement concluded by the Community…”178 Similarly, as 
noted by Reyes Tagle in respect of the doctrine of consistent interpretation in the 
Andean Community:  
 
“the ACJ has shown its preference for the utilization of the doctrine of consistent 
interpretation and maintained that, whenever possible and necessary, community 
law should be interpreted in conformity with international agreements, in 
particular if international law has been the source of community law. The ACJ 
has recognized the usefulness of the concepts and categories of international law 
to clarify community law, in particular whenever some ambiguous or blurred 
terms are found. It also shows its preference, whenever possible, for compatible 
interpretation of these two rules, in particular if the international norm has been 
a source of community law”.179 
 
On the other side, RTA tribunals have also engaged in, as Bronckers puts it, a “muted 
dialogue with WTO tribunals”.180 The ECJ has also resorted to WTO case law in order 
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to interpret WTO law and avoid conflict of norms. Despite these efforts, neither the ECJ 
nor the ACJ permit the member states of their regional organizations to employ WTO 
law as a defense to deviate from their obligation to comply with Community law.
181
 The 
MERCOSUR tribunals follow this same stance. 
 
Although both the EU and the EU members are bound by the international agreements 
signed by the EU,
182
 the ECJ denies direct effect to WTO law. As a result, it will not 
review the legality of EU law vis-à-vis WTO law. It should be noted that this ECJ 
stance has evoked criticism,
183
 and its grounds of justification for such denial has been 
seen as “not legally persuasive”.184  
 
In the Andean Community, member states have invoked their rights derived from the 
WTO agreements to justify their national measures before the ACJ. In its Ruling 28-AI-
2001, the ACJ dismissed the argument of Ecuador which tried to justify some 
restrictions on imports imposed on soybean meal based on the application of the 
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures of the WTO.
185
 In its Ruling 118-
AI-2003, the ACJ noted that Colombia had invoked WTO law as a defense for the 
utilization of safeguard measures. The ACJ replied that the Andean legal order 
prevailed over any international or national norm.
186
 In this respect, the ACJ closed the 
door on claims for the application of WTO law and stressed the autonomy of the 
Andean system which, in the ACJ´s view, means that this system does not derive from 
either the national legal order of the member states or the international agreements that 
they sign.
187
 As Reyes Tagle clarifies “Because of that focus, the ACJ has, on several 
occasions, refused to be bound by the international agreements signed by its member 
states and has insisted that WTO law is not binding for the Andean Community”.188 In 
addition, the ACJ refused to admit “the coexistence of two different international legal 
orders which Andean countries could conveniently choose between, disregarding the 
less favorable”.189 
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Similarly, in MERCOSUR, arbitral tribunals have been confronted with the question of 
whether WTO law could be regarded as directly applicable in MERCOSUR law. In this 
context, these tribunals have not accepted the argument that WTO law could be directly 
applied and conditioned the applicability of WTO rules upon the explicit approval of 
such application in the MERCOSUR legal system.
190
 As seen, these RTA courts of 
justice refuse to accept the application of WTO law as a defense to overlook their 
regional law. The pertinent question is: why should the WTO panel and Appellate Body 
set aside WTO agreements to accept a WTO-inconsistent measure agreed on under an 
RTA when RTA tribunals defend the full application of and compliance with RTA law 
in situations where it is challenged by WTO law? 
 
In this context, the autonomy of legal regimes such as that of the WTO and RTAs needs 
to be taken into account when addressing their relationship, in particular if RTA rules 
are to be used as a defense in addressing WTO claims so as to render WTO agreements 
inapplicable. The regional courts’ concern for the compliance with RTA provisions is 
demonstrated even more clearly in its approach to the WTO system. This can be seen in 
the reaction of the regional courts to the WTO membership of states in the light of the 
RTA rules. 
 
In the WTO context, so long as the full application of the WTO covered agreements 
norms is not set aside, the panel and Appellate Body could interpret and compare WTO 
law in the light of other international agreements. The jurisprudence of the panel and 
Appellate Body confirms this way of dealing with non-WTO agreements. For instance, 
in US-Shrimp, the Appellate Body referred to international environmental instruments 
such as the Convention on Biological Diversity, the 1982 United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, and Agenda 21 when assessing the scope of the term “natural 
resources”.191 Thus consultation of non-WTO agreements is part of the work that the 
panel and Appellate Body will undertake to interpret WTO rules. However, it should be 
noted that such a review of non-WTO agreements that the Appellate Body undertook 
does not imply an application of such agreements to settle the dispute or to set aside 
WTO law.  
 
Again, in Korea-Government Procurement, when the panel noted the scope of Article 
3.2 of the DSU, it concluded that “to the extent there is no conflict or inconsistency, or 
an expression in a covered WTO agreement that implies differently, we are of the view 
that the customary rules of international law apply to the WTO treaties and to the 
process of treaty formation under the WTO.”192 Arguably, in light of this jurisprudence, 
a non-WTO rule which conflicts with WTO agreements will not be applicable in the 
WTO context. In Peru-Agricultural Products, since the Appellate Body concluded that 
the Peruvian PRS was WTO-inconsistent, a conflict between the FTA between Peru and 
Guatemala and WTO agreements would arise upon the eventual entry into force of the 
FTA, and such FTA should not be invoked as a defense to overlook WTO agreements. 
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In the terms outlined above, the way of dealing with non-WTO agreements or non-RTA 
rules by the Appellate Body and the RTA tribunals, respectively, reveals the openness 
of these jurisdictional bodies towards international law. However, this openness cannot 
jeopardize the legal system they are bound to ensure.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Articles 3.7 and 3.10 of the DSU embody two important good faith obligations of the 
WTO Member States in the context of the WTO dispute settlement system. The good 
faith friendly approach observed in the panel and Appellate Body’s jurisprudence has 
been underscored in the recent Peru-Agricultural Products case. Particularly 
noteworthy in this regard are the difficulties in rebutting the presumption of good faith 
of a Member’s decision to engage in WTO proceedings. The Appellate Body confirmed 
that a waiver to initiate WTO dispute settlement proceedings had to be clearly 
stipulated. 
 
At the same time, regardless of whether Guatemala defeated the object and purpose of 
the FTA by bringing the dispute to the WTO, the case under study reveals, from a 
conceptual point of view, that a Member’s good faith obligation under general 
international law can only be taken into account if it is consistent with the WTO 
covered agreements and invoked as part of a good faith expression under WTO law. 
This sheds light on the relative autonomy of the principle of good faith in WTO dispute 
settlement, as well as on the boundaries of this principle with regard to the legal system 
in which it is applied. In effect, non-WTO obligations cannot gloss over the most 
specific WTO rules which are applicable to a dispute between WTO Members. 
 
Although we agree with the panel and Appellate Body that Guatemala did not act 
contrary to the principle of good faith in challenging the Peruvian PRS in the WTO, it is 
arguable that their recommendation will amount to an unforeseen de facto modification 
of the FTA provision which allowed Peru to maintain the PRS.  
 
An FTA including a principle of prevalence clearly shows the intention of the parties to 
prefer the application of the FTA over WTO rules, at least as between themselves. The 
recognition of the existence of higher ranking obligations and rights conferred by FTAs 
poses a daunting challenge to the WTO dispute settlement system to the extent that 
WTO Members may attempt to avail themselves on such provisions to disregard their 
multilateral obligations as Peru did. Security and predictability will be affected if any 
non-WTO agreement may constitute grounds to set aside WTO law. The different 
interpretation of WTO agreements depending on the FTAs signed by the parties to a 
dispute would be tantamount to accepting the fragmentation of the multilateral trading 
system. It is submitted that the application of principle of prevalence of FTA law over 
WTO rules does not fall under the aegis of WTO law. As such, it cannot be employed to 
overlook WTO rights and obligations in the WTO bearing in mind that the panel and 
Appellate Body recommendations cannot modify the existing WTO rights and 
obligations by adding to or diminishing them.  
 
The review of the case law of some RTA tribunals reveals that they follow a tougher 
approach and reject the argument that WTO agreements could be employed as a defense 
to set aside RTA provisions. This approach is more consistent with their mandate to 
oversee the fulfillment of RTA law than non-RTA rules such as those of the WTO. 
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Such an approach is also applicable to the panel and Appellate Body which are bound to 
assess whether a WTO Member has complied with WTO law instead of applying FTA 
provisions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
   
 
 
